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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROLLAND BURGESS and THE ) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ) 
UTAH ) 
) Case No. 970404-CA 
Respondents, ) 
) Priority Classification: 
vs. ) 
) 7 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL, JWR ) 
CONSTRUCTION and WORKERS ) 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, ) 
Petitioners. ) 
BRIEF OF WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL and 
JWR CONSTRUCTION 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to §§34A-l-30(2)(b); 34A-1-303(2)(c)(ii); 34A-1-
303(6); 34A-2-80K7) ; 34A-2-801 (8) (a) ; Utah Code Ann. 1997 
and 63-46B-16, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE APPEAL: 
1. Did the Industrial Commission misinterpret the 
interplay between Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-988 (claim barred if 
it is not filed within six years from the date of the 
accidental injury), Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-659 (temporary 
total disability compensation paid over a period of eight 
years from the date of accidental injury) and Utah Code Ann. 
§§35-1-78 (1) & (3)(a) & (b),10 which grant the Commission 
continuing jurisdiction but specifically provides that 
11
 [T] he commission has no power to change the statutes of 
limitation..." of the Workers Compensation Act? 
2. In other words, when the Commission dismisses a 
claim, either on its merits or without prejudice, does the 
Workers Compensation Act of Utah require an applicant to 
8
. Currently Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-417, (1997). 
9
 Currently Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410, (1997). 
10
. Currently Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-420, (1997). 
2 
file another Application for Hearing when the injured worker 
has evidence of a change in circumstance justifying the 
Commission's applying its continuing jurisdiction within the 
six-year period established by the Legislature in Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-98 or the eight-year period of Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-65? 
3. When an injured worker files an application for 
hearing, are the defendants entitled to have a hearing and 
decision on the merits as the facts exist at the time of the 
application? In other words, is the filing of an 
application for hearing an appropriate mechanism to prevent 
limitation periods from running on unripe claims? 
STANDAt 
The standard of review is a correction of error 
standard without deference to the decision of the 
administrative agency when "the agency has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law." Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-26b-16(4)(d) & (h)(iv); 
Questar Pipeline v Utah State Tax Comm'nt 817 P.2d 316 
(Utah 1991); Morton International, Inc., v\ Auditing 
Division ~f the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991); Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 
(Utah App. 1991) . 
3 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98/ (1990). Claims and 
benefits. 
* • * * 
(2) A claim for compensation for 
temporary total disability benefits, 
temporary partial disability benefits, 
permanent partial disability benefits, 
or permanent total disability benefits 
is barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed.•.within six years 
after the date of the accident. 
(Emphasis added) (appendix 1) 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78, (1990). 
Continuing jurisdiction of commission--
No authority to change statutes of 
limitation--Authority to destroy 
records--Interest on award--Authority to 
approve final settlement claims. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the 
commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The commission, after 
notice and hearing, may from time to 
time modify or change its former 
findings and orders... 
**** 
(3) (a) This section may not be 
interpreted as modifying in any respect 
the statutes of limitations contained in 
other sections of this chapter... 
(b) The commission has no power to 
change the statutes of limitation 
referred to in Subsection (3)(a) in any 
respect. 
(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 2) 
4 
3. Utah Code Aim. §35-1-65(1), (1981) Temporary 
disability 
...In no case shall [temporary total 
disability] compensation exceed 312 
weeks...over a period of eight years 
from the date of the injury. 
(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 3) 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66, (1990' k 19 1 1 ) 
Permanent partial disability,.. 
An employee who sustained a permanent 
impairment as a result of an industrial 
accident and who files an application 
for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may 
receive a permanent partial disability 
award from the commission. 
(Emphasis Added)(Appendix 5) 
5. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67, (1988 & 1994) 
Permanent total disability 
[Both are silent as to any limitation 
period.] 
(Appendix 6) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Statement of the Nature of the Case 
This is a workers compensation claim by respondent 
Rolland Burgess (hereinafter "Burgess") for benefits 
provided by the Workers Compensation Act of Utah. (§§35-1-1 
to 109) On March 25, 1996, Burgess filed two Applications 
for Hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah11 
(hereinafter the "Commission"). The first was for a July 1, 
11
. Currently the Labor Commission of Utah. 
5 
1990, accident against his employer at the time, Siaperas 
Sand and Gravel (hereinafter, "Siaperas"). (R. 1-2; 
Appendix 8) The second was for an August 18, 1994, accident 
while he was employed with JWR Construction (Hereinafter, 
"JWR"). (R. 10-11; Appendix 9). In each case the Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah (Hereinafter, "WCF") was the 
insurer for workers compensation purposes. In each he 
claimed entitlement to additional medical benefits, 
temporary total compensation, permanent partial 
compensation, travel expenses and interest. (R. 1 and 10) 
WCF responded on April 23 and 24, 1996, on behalf of 
itself and Burgess' employers. Among other admissions and 
denials, WCF admitted Burgess was involved in accidents 
arising out of and in the course of employment on the dates 
alleged, but denied that Burgess was entitled to any 
additional compensation or medical benefits. (R. 29-31 and 
32-33) 
The claims were thereafter set for a joint hearing. 
(R. 35) 
Statement of the Course of the Proceedings 
1. At the evidentiary hearing scheduled for August 
28, 1996, the parties were present and represented by their 
respective counsel. (R. 187-254) Before commencing with the 
evidence, Burgess filed two motions: 1) "Motion to Amend 
6 
Application for Hearing and Join the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund" in which he moved to amend each application to include 
a claim for permanent total disability compensation (Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-67.12) (R. 182-186; Appendix 10); and 2) 
"Motion to Continue Without Date the Applicant's Claim for 
Additional Benefits" (R. 185-186; Appendix 11). WCF opposed 
the motions. 
2. After briefing by the parties, on November 22, 
1996, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Elicerio entered her 
Order on Motion to Amend. (R. 291-296; Appendix 12) Judge 
Elicerio ordered: 
...[T]he applicant/petitioner's Motion to Amend 
Application for Hearing and Join the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund is granted and the 
applicant/petitioner's Motion to Continue Without 
Date the Applicant's Claim for Additional Benefits 
is denied. 
[T]he amended claim is dismissed without 
prejudice as there is no justiciable issue at this 
time. 
(R. 2 95; Appendix 12 at page 5) 
3. Each side filed motions for review of the 
administrative law judge's order. (WCF, R, 2 97-310; 
Burgess, 311-315). Each side filed a reply Lo l lit; other's 
motion. (WCF, R. 316-330; Burgess, R. 332-336) Burgess 
claimed: 
Currently Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-413, (1997) 
7 
A. The administrative law judge erred when 
she denied the petitioner's motion to 
continue without date his claim for 
additional benefits...[or] in the alternative 
the... Commission may want to rule that the 
timely filing of an application for 
additional future benefits, even if it is 
dismissed without prejudice, is sufficient to 
toll the running of the statute of 
limitations. 
312 and 314) 
B. Petitioner's right to amend his 
applications is not extinguished [by the 
statute of limitations and]...should 
relate back to the time of the filing of 
the original applications. 
331 and 333) 
WCF argued: 
A. The applicant's right to amend his 
application for hearing...against 
Siaperas Sand and Gravel, is 
extinguished because the six-year 
statute of limitations had run on his 
claim for permanent total disability [by 
the time of the filing of the motion]. 
298) 
B. If the applicant is permitted to 
amend his original application for 
hearing, the amended claims should be 
dismissed with prejudice. §35-1-78. A 
dismissal without prejudice is 
inappropriate as it implies that 
"... further proceedings are 
required...before the agency's final 
response to the claims will be made." 
Doubletree, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 
797 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah App. 1990). No 
further proceedings are necessary. 
299-300) 
8 
(R. 317) 
C. Continuing the petitioner's claims 
for future benefits without date is not 
within the ... Commission's continuing 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §35-1-
78; 
D. There is no provision for an indefinite 
tolling of the statute of limitations contained in 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98, nor can this statute be 
interpreted as allowing such tolling. 
(R. 319) 
Disposition by the Labor Commission 
The Labor Commission entered its "Order on Motions for 
Review" on June 9, 1997, denying both parties' motions for 
review and ruled: 
1. When the administrative law judge dismissed the 
applications, the alleged error of allowing an amendment to 
include an otherwise barred claim for permanent total 
disability became moot; and 
2. "In light of the Industrial Commission's 
continuing jurisdiction in this case, it j^ unnecessary to 
hold Mr. Burgess' application for hearing open. Instead, 
Mr. Burgess may request that the Industrial Commission 
reopen the matter if future developments wdiiant such a 
request." The Commission cited Stoker v. The Workers' 
Compensation Fund, 889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994)(Appendix 
15) to support its ruling. 
(R. 347-351) 
Statement of Facts 
1. Burgess, alleged he sustained two compensable 
industrial injuries. The first occurred on July 1, 1990, 
while he was working for Siaperas Sand and Gravel. The 
second occurred on August 18, 1994, while he was working for 
JWR, Inc. He filed Applications for Hearing for each claim 
on March 25, 1996. In each Application Burgess claimed 
entitlement to Medical Expenses, Recommended Medical Care, 
Temporary Total Compensation, Permanent Partial 
Compensation, Travel Expenses and Interest. (R. 1-2, 10-
11; Appendices 8 & 9) 
3. WCF answered on behalf of Siaperas Sand and Gravel 
and JWR Construction admitting that Burgess had suffered 
accidents on the dates as alleged, but denying that Burgess 
was entitled to any additional benefits. (R. 29-31 and 32-
33) 
4. An evidentiary hearing was set for August 28, 1996. 
(R. 35) On the date of the hearing, Burgess filed two 
motions: 
A. "Motion to Amend Application for Hearing and 
Join the Employer's Reinsurance Fund" in which Burgess 
asserts for the first time a claim for permanent total 
disability benefits for each alleged accident (R. 182-184, 
Appendix 10); and 
10 
H "Motion to Continue Without Date the 
Applicant's Claim for Additional Benefits" in which Burgess 
cited the reason for the amended applications and this 
motion is "...to preserve his claim for these additional 
benefits..." (R. 185-186, Appendix 11) There was no claim 
of a justiciable controversy or that Burgess was currently-
entitled to any additional benefits. 
5. WCF responded on September 25, 1996. (R. 259-269) 
Therein, WCF asserted: 
A. It is inappropriate to fi"]p an Application 
for Hearing to preserve rights with an open ended extension 
of time to take action. The filing of the application 
constitutes an affirmation that there are issues that need 
to be determined on their merits as the facts then exist. 
The defendants are as entitled to their "day in court" to 
dispose of claims < »u their merits as i.o the -applicant; 
B. Burgess is not entitled to enlarge upon the 
applicable limitation periods of Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-98 
and 35-1-35-1-65(1); and 
C. Burgess should not be allowed to amend his 
application to include a claim for permanent total 
disability compensation (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-6 7) it the 
amendment's sole purpose is to preserve an unripe potential 
11 
future claim after the six-year limitation period of Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-98 has expired. 
6. On November 22, 1996, the Administrative Law Judge 
entered her "Order on Motion to Amend". (R. 291-296, 
Appendix 12) Among other findings and rulings, she: 
A. Commented the case authority and statutory 
authority is unclear as to whether to allow the amendment or 
not and she therefore would allow the proposed amendment (R. 
294, Appendix 12 at p. 4); 
B. Declined to continue the matter without date 
but dismissed the application "without prejudice" (R. 294, 
Appendix 12 at p. 4); 
C. Declined to rule on what effect, if any, the 
requested amendments will have on the right to claim future 
benefits (R. 294, Appendix 12 at p. 4); and 
D. Declined to take a position on what 
limitations apply to the accidents commenting that "...this 
area of the law remains unsettled in the appellate courts". 
(R. 294, Appendix 12 at p. 4) 
7. On December 20, 1996, Burgess filed a Motion for 
Review (R. 311-315) in which he challenged the 
Administrative Law Judge's failure to continue the 
applications without date and instead dismissing them 
without prejudice. 
12 
8. On January 3, 1997, Workers Compensation Fund, on 
behalf of its defendant insureds, responded to Burgess' 
Motion for Review and argued (R. 297-310): 
A. There is no provision in the Workers 
Compensation Act of Utah which allows an indefinite tolling 
of the limitation period of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98. 
B. The commission's continuing jurisdiction 
provided by Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 does not allow it to 
extend the limitation periods of Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-98 
and 35-1-65 (1) . 
C. Furthermore, Burgess' amendment should not be 
allowed to revive a claim for permanent total disability 
arising from his 1990 accident for which claim the six year 
limitation period of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98 had expired 
following his original application but before his Motion to 
Amend was filed. 
9. The Industrial Commission entered its "Order on 
Motions for Review" on June 9, 1997, (R. 341-345, Appendix 
13) and ruled: 
A. When the administrative law judge dismissed 
the applications, the alleged error of allowing an amendment 
to include an otherwise barred claim for permanent total 
disability became moot; and 
13 
B. " I n l i g h t of t h e I n d u s t r i a l C o m m i s s i o n ' s 
c o n t i n u i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s c a s e , i t i s u n n e c e s s a r y t o 
h o l d Mr. B u r g e s s ' a p p l i c a t i o n f o r h e a r i n g o p e n . I n s t e a d , 
Mr. B u r g e s s may r e q u e s t t h a t t h e I n d u s t r i a l Commission 
r e o p e n t h e m a t t e r i f f u t u r e d e v e l o p m e n t s w a r r a n t s u c h a 
r e q u e s t . " The Commission c i t e d Stoker v. The Workers' 
Compensation Fund, 889 P .2d 409 , 412 (Utah 19 9 4 ) ( A p p e n d i x 
15) a s s u p p o r t i v e of i t s r u l i n g . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 8 , (1990) (Appendix 1) i n 
c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h i n d i v i d u a l code s e c t i o n s , p r o v i d e s b o t h 
s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n and l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e e x t e n t of 
c o m p e n s a t i o n t h e L e g i s l a t u r e h a s c h o s e n t o p r o v i d e f o r 
i n j u r e d w o r k e r s . 1 3 S t a t u t e s such a s t h e week ly c o m p e n s a t i o n 
s t a t u t e s t h a t a r e t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s p e t i t i o n which r e q u i r e 
f i l i n g w i t h i n a s e t p e r i o d f o l l o w i n g an a c c i d e n t a r e 
s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n . Avis v . Industrial Commission, 117 
P . 2 d 670, 587-88 (Utah App. 1 9 9 2 ) ( A p p e n d i x 1 7 ) . See a l s o . 
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 Temporary T o t a l D i s a b i l i t y . Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 , (1981) (Appendix 
3) Temporary T o t a l D i s a b i l i t y shall not exceed 312 weeks,..over a period of 
eight years after date of the injury. C u r r e n t l y Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410, 
(1997) . (Appendix 3) 
Permanent P a r t i a l D i s a b i l i t y . Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66(1990 & 1991 i n t h i s 
c a s e ) ( A p p e n d i x 5) An employee...who files an application for hearing under Utah 
Code Ann. Section 35-1-98 may receive a permanent partial disability award from 
the commission. C u r r e n t l y Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-412, (1997) . (Appendix 5) 
Permanent T o t a l D i s a b i l i t y . Utah Code Ann §35-1 -67 , (1988 and 1994 i n t h i s 
c a s e ) ( A p p e n d i x 6) i s s i l e n t r e g a r d i n g a s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . ( C u r r e n t l y Utah 
Code Ann. §34A-2-413, (1997) . (Appendix 7) 
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Stoker v. Industrial Comm'n, 889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 
1994)(Appendix 15); Middlestadt v. Industrial Comm'n, 852 
P.2d 1012, 1013 (Utah App. 1993)(Appendix 16). 
Moreover, each weekly compensation entitlement section 
of the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah (Utah Code Ann. 
§§35-1-1 to 109) (Hereinafter, the "Act") individually, or 
in combination with Section 98, limits the outside date of 
onset and the period during which the disability must occur 
if it is to be compensated. The duration of the 
compensation benefit is likewise prescribed. 
The limits placed on the disability compensation 
benefits are a part of the careful balancing of respective 
rights between employees and employers embodied in the Act. 
It fulfills the basic purpose of the Act. It provides a no-
fault solution to a particularly severe social evil of the 
industrial age, ie. leaving industry's injured workers and 
their dependent spouses and children impoverished and 
subjects of public assistance. It likewise provides the 
employer with a system of well-defined, predictable, and 
limited no-fault liability for employees injured on the job. 
(See Appendix 18 "Workers' Compensation Act, A Careful 
Balancing of Constitutional Rights".) 
The limitation periods within which to file an 
Application for Hearing for the various types of 
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disabilities provided for by the Act are not in conflict 
with the Commission's continuing jurisdiction provided by 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78. The Legislature cured any such 
conflict by giving priority to the limitations: 
(3) 
(a) This section may not be 
interpreted as modifying in any 
respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this 
chapter... 
(b) The commission has no power to 
change the statutes of limitations 
referred to in Subsection (a) in 
any respect. 
(Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(3)(a) & (b), (1990)(Appendix 2) 
(Emphasis Added) 
The Commission's order in this matter has the effect of 
giving Burgess and other similarly situated claimants open-
ended relief from the legislature's mandated limitations. 
That is contrary to the plain language of the statutes 
involved. It is contrary to the basic intent and purpose of 
the act to provide certain balanced rights between injured 
workers and their employers. 
One of the rights that inures to the benefit of each 
party is the right to a hearing on the merits once an 
employee files an Application for Hearing. With a filing, 
the employer and its insurance carrier are entitled to put 
the applicant to his or her burden to prove the claim(s) 
made in the application by the weight of the evidence as it 
16 
then exists. Once an accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employment is established, if the applicant 
cannot support claims for weekly compensation benefits, such 
claims should be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
The Commission then loses jurisdiction over the already 
adjudicated matters. In appropriate cases, the Commission's 
jurisdiction can thereafter be invoked pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-78, but only by a timely application for hearing 
supported by a prima facie showing of a material change in 
the applicant's condition which occurred subsequent to the 
earlier order. The application must be filed within the 
time limitations of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98 or the specific 
applicable code section. 
To do otherwise as argued by Burgess below is contrary 
to the clear statutory language and legislative intent. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE LIMITATION PERIODS ESTABLISHED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE FOR WEEKLY COMPENSATION BENEFITS IN 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-98 OR INDIVIDUAL STATUTES 
ARE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS AND JUSTIFIABLE 
LIMITATIONS ON THE EXTENT OF NO-FAULT BENEFITS 
AVAILABLE TO INJURED WORKMEN. THEY ARE 
LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMISSION'S CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION ESTABLISHED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-
78. 
A. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN UTAH CODE ANN. §§35-1-
78 AND 35-1-98 IN CONJUNCTION WITH UTAH CODE ANN. 
§§35-1-65, -66, AND -67 SHOWS A CLEAR LEGISLATIVE 
INTENT. EVEN SHOULD THE COURT FIND THE STATUTES 
AMBIGUOUS OR CONFLICTING, THE SPECIFIC LIMITATION 
LANGUAGE OF §35-1-98 AND/OR THE INDIVIDUAL 
SECTIONS, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ARE CONTROLLING. 
THAT LEADS TO BUT ONE CONCLUSION: ANY DISABILITY 
WHICH COMMENCES AFTER THE SPECIFIC APPLICABLE 
LIMITATION PERIOD IS NOT COMPENSABLE. AN 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING FILED BEFORE THE 
DISABILITY OCCURS DOES NOT TOLL THE LIMITATION 
PERIOD. 
In O'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 929 P.2d 1112 
(Utah App. 1996), this Court succinctly set forth the rules 
of statutory construction applicable to this case: 
We begin by examining the statute's plain language 
and resort to other methods of statutory 
interpretation only if the language of the statute 
is ambiguous. In examining the plain language of 
the statute, we attempt to give meaning to each 
part of the statute so as to give effect to all of 
the statutory terms. If doubt remains, "the court 
should analyze the act in its entirety and 
harmonize its provisions in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose. Within these 
confines, we attempt "to give effect to the intent 
of the legislature in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve." 
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O'Keefe, 929 P.2d at 1114 (Citations omitted.) 
The Supreme Court established clear precedent in 
resolving the issue of whether Section 78 or a specific 
statute of limitations should prevail in the context of 
workers' compensation law. The dispositive case is United 
States Smelting, Refining and Mining Company vs. Nielsen, 
430 P.2d 162 (Utah 1967). (Appendix 14) Nielsen was a 
miner injured in a 1952 cave-in. After having received 
compensation periodically and a lump sum settlement, Nielsen 
had complications which required further surgery. He 
suffered additional permanent partial impairment as a 
result. In 1965 he filed a claim for additional 
compensation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66 (1951) . 
The Supreme Court held Nielsen's claim to be time-barred. 
The Court also held Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 does not 
override the time restrictions of limitation periods of 
specific statutes: 
Defendant in this case says that Sec. [35-1-78, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953] overrides the six -year 
limitation statutes when it says that: 
"the powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change 
with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be 
justified." 
We have no quarrel with the above statute, but 
construe it to mean the commission has continuing 
jurisdiction only during the period of the 
limitation statutes mentioned above, and has 
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nothing to do with the abrogation of or exception 
to such limitations statutes... 
430 P.2d at 164.(Appendix 14 at page 3)14 (Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in the instant case, the Commission 
erroneously, or because of the confusion expressed by the 
administrative law judge, contends Section 78 allows it 
indefinite, continuing jurisdiction to modify its orders 
and, apparently to make awards for disabilities occurring 
after the specific limitation periods of the statutes. 
The limitations placed on Burgess' claims by the 
Legislature as of the time of his accidents are: 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98, (1990). Claims and 
benefits. 
**** 
(2) A claim for compensation for 
temporary t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y benef i t s , 
temporary p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y benef i t s , 
permanent p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y benef i t s , 
or permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y benef i t s 
i s barred, unless an application for 
hearing i s f i l ed . • .w i th in s ix years 
a f t e r the date of the accident . 
(Emphasis added) (Appendix 1) 
2 . Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 ( 1 ) , (1981) 
Temporary d i s a b i l i t y 
14
 . See a l so Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Anderson, 514 P.2d 217, 
217-218 (Utah 1973) c i t i n g approvingly the holding in Nielsen regarding the 
l i m i t a t i o n per iod for weekly "compensation" benef i t s while holding t ha t medical 
bene f i t s are not "compensation" to which the l i m i t a t i o n a p p l i e s . 
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...In no case shall [temporary total 
disability] compensation exceed 312 
weeks...over a period of eight years 
from the date of the injury. 
(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 3] 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66, (1990 & 1991) 
Permanent partial disability... 
An employee who sustained a permanent 
impairment as a result of an industrial 
accident and who files an application 
for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may 
receive a permanent partial disability 
award from the commission. 
(Emphasis Added)(Appendix 5) 
4. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67, (1988 & 1994) 
Permanent total disability 
[Both the 1988 and 1994 version are 
silent as to any limitation period, 
therefore §98 applies.] 
(Appendix 6) 
The Commission fails to recognize that it has no power 
to "...change..." or to "modify in any respect the statutes 
of limitations contained in other sections of [the Act]... 
in any respect.." Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 (Appendix 2) 
There are differences in the applicable limitation 
periods.15 However, the basic rule of statutory 
15
. See, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65 above dealing with Temporary Total 
Disability. Also, though not claimed by Burgess herein and therefore not at 
issue, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-65.1, (1990) Temporary Partial Disability provides a 
specific limitation period 
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial 
disability for work at any time prior to eight years after the date 
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construction found in Nielsen provides that a specific 
limitation period takes precedent over the general 
continuing jurisdiction of the Commission as well as any 
general limitation period. 
Applying the holding of Nielsen, the Commission should 
have dismissed Burgess' Applications on the merits based on 
his failure to make a prima facie showing of a current 
entitlement to any weekly compensation benefits. That would 
result in Burgess' claims for permanent total disability 
(Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67) and for permanent partial 
disability (Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66) for the 1990 accident 
being totally barred because he cannot show either a 
permanent total disability commencing within the six-year 
period or an additional permanent partial impairment 
occurring within the six-year period from the date of his 
accident as required by Section 98. 
As to Burgess' other claims for weekly compensation not 
already barred, he would have the burden to present prima 
of the injury to an employee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not 
finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-
98. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor 
continue more than eight years after the date of the injury. . . 
(Emphasis Added)(Appendix 4) 
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facie evidence of a material change in his condition and 
that one of the disabilities for which compensation is 
provided has occurred within the specified period by a 
likewise timely filing of an Application for Hearing. Only 
in that manner could the continuing jurisdiction of the 
Commission be invoked. 
For the July 1, 1990, accident the only remaining claim 
for weekly compensation is for temporary total disability 
compensation. Provided he can sustain his burden of proof, 
Burgess is entitled to up to ...312 weeks...over a period of 
eight years from the date of the injury. Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-65(1), (1981) (Appendix 3) Applying a liberal 
interpretation favoring coverage16, he can invoke the 
continuing jurisdiction of the Commission up to June 30, 
1998, by filing an application for hearing. 
Applying the same principles to the August 18, 1994, 
accident: 
1. §35-1-67 Burgess does not have current proof of 
an entitlement to permanent total disability. To 
perfect a claim, he must refile before the 
expiration of six years from the date of the 
accident to invoke the continuing jurisdiction of 
From the inception of the Act, the appellate courts of Utah have held 
that it is to be liberally construed to afford coverage for injured workmen. 
Ortega v. Salt Lake Wet Was Laundry, 156 P.2d 885, 885-886 (Utah 1945) 
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the Commission. He must present prima facie 
evidence of such disability occurring within six 
years from the date of his accident or not later 
than August 17, 2 000; 
2. §35-1-66 Burgess does not have current proof of 
an entitlement to permanent partial disability 
compensation. To perfect a claim, he must refile 
before the expiration of six years from the date 
of the accident to invoke the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Commission. He must present 
prima facie evidence of such disability occurring 
within six years from the date of his accident or 
not later than August 17, 2 0 00; and 
3. §35-1-65 Burgess does not have current proof of 
an entitlement to temporary total disability 
compensation. To perfect a claim, he must refile 
before the expiration of eight years from the date 
of the accident to invoke the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Commission. He must present 
prima facie evidence of such disability occurring 
within eight years from the date of his accident 
or not later than August 17, 2002. 
The Nielsen principle of construction has not changed 
since 1967--the [C]ommission has continuing jurisdiction 
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only during the period of the limitation statutes. 430 P.2nd 
at 164. 
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES LEAVES NO 
DOUBT THAT THE SIX-YEAR AND EIGHT-YEAR LIMITS ARE 
ALSO LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMISSION'S CONTINUING 
JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS. 
The l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d s of t h e code s e c t i o n s a t i s s u e 
a r e s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n . See Stoker v. Workers 
Compensation Fund, 889 P .2d 409 , 412 (Utah 1994) 
( i n t e r p r e t i n g Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 ( 1 ) (Appendix 1 5 ) ; 
Middlestadt v. Industrial Commission, 852 P .2d 1012, 1013-14 
(Utah App. 1993) , i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e s i m i l a r s t a t u t e of 
l i m i t a t i o n found i n Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 9 , (1953) 
( R e p e a l e d ) 1 7 (Appendix 1 6 ) ; and Avis v. Industrial 
Commission, 837 P .2d 584, 584-588 (Utah App. 1992) 
( i n t e r p r e t i n g Utah Code Ann. §§35-1 -65 & 66) (Appendix 1 7 ) . 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 7 8 ( 1 ) must be r e a d i n c o n j u n c t i o n 
w i t h Utah Code Ann. §§ 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 , -66, -67 and - 9 8 . A f t e r t h e 
Commission o b t a i n s j u r i s d i c t i o n , " . . . T h e powers and 
j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e commiss ion . . . s h a l l be c o n t i n u i n g . The 
commiss ion , a f t e r n o t i c e and h e a r i n g , may from t i m e t o t i m e 
modi fy o r change i t s fo rmer f i n d i n g s and o r d e r s . . . " U tah 
The subs tant ive provis ions of Utah Code Ann. Section 3 5-1-98 were 
f i r s t passed in 1988 as Utah Code Section 35-1-99 which sec t ion was repealed in 
1990 with i t s subs tan t ive p a r t s reenacted as Section 98. 
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Code Ann. §35-1-78(1) The Section 78 language has remained 
essentially unchanged since 1917. 
Utah appellate courts have had many opportunities to 
explore the limits of the continuing jurisdiction. The 
basis for a modification of a prior order is dependent upon 
a showing of a material change in the claimant's condition 
not previously adjudicated, based upon a new application for 
hearing making such claims. After a final decision on the 
merits, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to reopen, 
reconsider or change its original decision denying an award 
of compensation, in the absence of evidence of a change or 
new development. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 19 Utah 2d 158-60, 427 P.2d 952, 952-954 (1967) . 
This Court discussed the Kennecott decision favorably 
in Retherford vs. Industrial Comm'n and AT&T, 73 9 P.2d 76 
(Utah App. 1987): 
...In [the Kennecott] case, the Industrial 
Commission entered an order... denying a claim for 
benefits. The claimant filed an application for a 
rehearing.. .which was denied... [T]he commission 
rescinded its order...denying compensation and 
ordered a rehearing. The rehearing was held 
and...the commission entered an order granting 
benefits...Kennecott petitioned for judicial 
review contending that the commission did not have 
authority to make the award...The Utah Supreme 
Court...held that the commission did not have 
jurisdiction to make the award of benefits having 
once determined the matter on the merits. 
739 P.2d at 78-79 (Footnote 5 of the opinion omitted.) 
(Emphasis added.) 
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In 1988, the Legislature passed two significant 
amendments to the Workers Compensation Act. First, it added 
the six year limitation language for the first time applying 
a limitation period to permanent total disability 
compensation.18 Prior to 1988, unlike permanent partial 
disability19 and temporary total disability20,21 there was no 
specific limitation period imposed on claims for permanent 
total disability compensation.22 
Second, as part of the same package of legislation, the 
Legislature put additional limits on the Commission's 
continuing jurisdiction: 
( 3 ) 
(a) This sect ion may not be 
interpreted as modifying in any 
respect the s t a t u t e s of l imi ta t ions 
contained in other sect ions of t h i s 
c h a p t e r . . . 
(b) The commission has no power to 
change the s t a t u t e s of l imi t a t ions 
18
 . See Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 9 ( 3 ) , (1988) , which was l a t e r r e c o d i f i e d as 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 9 8 ( 2 ) , (1990) and c u r r e n t l y i s found unchanged as Utah Code 
Ann. §34A-2-417, (1997) . 
1 9
. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-66 , (1983), "The commission may make a permanent 
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y award a t any t ime p r i o r t o e i g h t y e a r s a f t e r t h e d a t e of 
i n j u r y t o an emp loyee . . .who f i l e s an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r such purpose p r i o r t o t h e 
e x p i r a t i o n of such e i g h t - y e a r p e r i o d . " 
20
 . Utah Code Ann. §35-1 -65 , "In no case s h a l l such compensa t ion b e n e f i t s 
exceed 312 weeks a t t h e r a t e of 100% of t h e s t a t e ave rage weekly wage a t t h e t ime 
of t h e i n j u r y ove r a p e r i o d of e i g h t y e a r s from t h e d a t e of t h e i n j u r y . " 
2 1
. Utah Code Ann. § 3 5 - 1 - 6 5 . 1 p r o v i d i n g f o r t empora ry p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y 
was f i r s t p a s s e d i n 1990. Before t h a t , t h e r e was no p r o v i s i o n f o r such b e n e f i t s . 
22 Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67 , (1985) 
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referred to in Subsection (a) in 
any respect. 
(Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78 (3) (a) & (b) , (1988) (Emphasis 
Added) 
Two things are clear from the current statutory format 
and appellate court decisions: 1) If one fails to file an 
Application for Hearing to have his or her claim adjudicated 
on the merits within the applicable period of time from the 
date of the accident, the claim is barred. The Commission 
never gained jurisdiction. 2) The Commission has no 
jurisdiction to relitigate those issues determined after a 
hearing on the merits by final order. However, if there is 
a material change in circumstance occurring at a later date, 
the Commission's continuing jurisdiction applies up to the 
outside time limits placed on it by specific statutes. 
In contrast, the effect of a continuance without a date 
of hearing as requested by the applicant, or a dismissal 
without prejudice, as the Commission did herein, present 
different scenarios not within the four squares of the Act 
as passed by the Legislature. First, a continuance without 
date leaves the parties hanging with no way to conclude the 
issues claimed in the Application. That is contrary to the 
Commission's own rule regarding applications for hearing: 
The Application for Hearing is the request for 
agency action... 
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Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.A, -4.B. (Emphasis added) An 
Application for Hearing is not a request for inaction. This 
rule is in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act 
and provides a mechanism for the Industrial Commission to 
determine the disputed legal interests of an applicant and 
his or her employer regarding benefit entitlements. See 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-l, -3 (1993 Supp. 1996.) The effect 
of a continuance without date is to allow Burgess to add 
claims for future benefits which both he and the Commission 
concede are "potential" and "speculative" future claims with 
no supporting evidence. That subverts the hearing process 
which is to provide a forum for workers compensation dispute 
resolution. 
Next, a dismissal without prejudice is notification to 
the parties that "'further proceedings are required,' i.e., 
refiling of the claims and more diligent prosecution of 
them, before the agency's final response to the claims will 
be made." Doubletree, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 797 P.2d 
464, 466 (Utah App. 1990) Cases that are dismissed without 
prejudice before the Labor Commission involve claims that 
present no justiciable issues or which have various 
procedural flaws. Bacon v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d 548, 
549 (Utah App. 1993) 
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In the instant case, Burgess applied for and received a 
hearing date. He invoked agency action. WCF, Siaperas and 
JWR appeared ready, willing and able to defend the claims. 
He, in essence, told the Commission, "I have no evidence to 
support claims to additional weekly compensation. I might 
have some at some indefinite time in the future. Though I 
do not know when it will be, please, take no action until I 
ask." There are no further proceedings required. There is 
nothing pending before the Commission. His claim should be 
closed. The claim can only be reopened by the filing of a 
new Application for Hearing asserting a change in 
circumstance subsequent to the date of the order 
adjudicating the issues he chose at this time to present to 
the Commission. If he fails to file an application for 
hearing...with the commission within six years after the 
date of the accident for permanent partial disability and/or 
permanent total disability and/or within eight years after 
the date of the accident for temporary total disability, his 
claims will be barred. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65, -66, -67, -78 and 35-1-98 
are parts of a careful balancing of the rights of employers 
and employees provided by the Workers' Compensation Act of 
Utah. (See Appendix 7, Workers' Compensation Act a Careful 
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Balancing of Constitutional Rights.) One those rights is 
the employers' right to have claims made by Applications for 
Hearing adjudicated on their merits as they exist at the 
time of the application. It is inappropriate to dismiss an 
application without prejudice when the purpose of the filing 
is not to adjudicate claims for presently accrued rights. 
If the applicant cannot prevail on his or her claims by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the claims should be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
The six-year limitation of section 98 establishes a 
time period during which an injured worker must file an 
application for hearing and within which permanent partial 
disability must occur or permanent total disability must 
commence for either to be compensable. Temporary total 
disability is compensable if an application for hearing is 
filed prior to the expiration of eight years. The injured 
worker is entitled to up to 312 weeks...over a period of 
eight years from the date of the injury. Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-65, (1981)(Emphasis added.)(Appendix 3) Those periods 
are both statutes of limitation and reasonable limits to the 
compensation benefit allowed under the Workers' Compensation 
Act of Utah. There is no inconsistency between Section 98 
and Section 78. As the Court held in Nielsen, the 
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commission has continuing jurisdiction only during the 
period of the limitation statutes. 430 P.2nd at 164. 
Again, when an applicant invokes the Commission's 
jurisdiction by an Application for Hearing, each party is 
entitled to have the issues determined on the merits as 
supported by the facts then existing. Following such a 
determination by the Commission, the issues presented by the 
Application are final adjudications. The Commission then 
loses jurisdiction as to those issues. Jurisdiction can 
again be invoked pursuant to Section 78 by a timely filing 
of another Application for Hearing. That application must 
be based upon material changes in circumstance subsequent to 
the prior order. Further, the application and the 
circumstance leading to a further claim for disability 
compensation must occur prior to the expiration of the 
applicable limitation period. Then and only then the 
Commission will have jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. 
Otherwise, it is without jurisdiction. 
The Commission's Order herein should be amended to 
dismiss the Application with prejudice and to reflect the 
limits placed on Burgess' potential future claims provided 
by the Workers Compensation Act of Utah as argued herein. 
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DATED this } day of December, 1997. 
JAMES R. BLACK & ASSOCIATES 
fee* 
s R.nBiack 
torneys for Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah 
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APPENDIX 1 Utah Code Ann. Section 35-
1-98, (1990) Claims and 
Benefits 
[Effective May 9, 1967-April 22, 1990.] 
*1990 Repeal and Reenactment* 
Section 35-1-98 was repealed in 1990 and reenacted to read as follows: 
35-1-98. Claims and benefits. 
(1) Except with respect to prosthetic devices, in nonpermanent total disability cases an employee's 
medical benefit entitlement ceases if the employee does not incur medical expenses reasonably 
related to the industrial accident, and submit those expenses to his employer or insurance carrier 
for payment, for a period of three consecutive years. 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability 
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total disability benefits is barred, 
unless an application for hearing is filed with the commission within six years after the date of 
the accident. 
(3) A claim for death benefits is barred unless an application for hearing is filed within one year of 
the date of death of the employee. 
[Effective April 23, 1990-present.] 
Tab 2 
APPENDIX 2 Utah Code Ann. Section 35-
1-78, (1990) Continuing 
Jurisdiction of Commission 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified. 
[Effective 1917-May 8, 1961.] 
*1961 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability, which have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 
years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
[Effective May 9, 1961-June30, 1963.] 
*1963 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which 
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
[Effective July 1, 1963-June 30, 1965.] 
*1965 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Award — Continuing jurisdiction to modify — Authority to destroy records. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which 
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
[Effective July 1, 1965-May 11, 1981.] 
*1981 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award - Authority to destroy 
194 
records — Interest on award. 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders with 
respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified, provided, however, that records pertaining to cases, 
other than those of total permanent disability or where a claim has been filed as in 35-1-99, which 
have been closed and inactive for a period of 10 years, may be destroyed at the discretion of the 
commission. 
Awards made by the industrial commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988] 
*1988 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten 
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-99, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Compensation Act. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in 
Subsection (a) in any respect. 
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990.] 
*1990 Amendment* 
35-1-78, Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten 
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2, Title 35, the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Law. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in 
Subsection (a) in any respect. 
[Effective April 23, 1990-May 1, 1994] 
*1994 Amendment* 
195 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten 
years, other than cases of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
(3) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitations referred to in 
Subsection (3)(a) in any respect. 
[Effective May 2, 1994-April 30, 1995.] 
*1995 Amendment* 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission to modify award — Authority to destroy 
records — Interest on award — No authority to change statutes of limitation — 
Authority to approve final settlement claims. 
(!) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing. The 
commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its former 
findings and orders. 
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases 
of total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-98, may 
be destroyed at the discretion of the commission. 
(3) Awards made by the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the 
date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable. 
(4) 
(a) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 2. 
(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred to in 
Subsection (4)(a) in any respect. 
(5) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 35-1-90, the commission shall review and may 
approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final: 
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under 
Chapters 1 and 2; 
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit 
entitlements under Chapters 1 and 2 by means of a lump sum payment, structured 
settlement, or other appropriate payout. 
[Effective May 1, 1995-present.] 
Tab 3 
APPENDIX 3 Utah Code Ann. Section 35-
1-65, (1981) Temporary 
Disability 
*1981 Amendment* 
35-1-65. Temporary disability — Amount of payments — State average weekly wage deflned. 
(1) In case of temporary disability, the employee shall receive 66%% of that employee's average 
weekly wages at the time of the injury so long as such disability is total, but not more than a 
maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not 
less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent 
child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, not to 
exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. In no case shall such 
compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury over a period of eight years from the date of the injury. 
In the event a light duty medical release is obtained prior to the employee reaching a 
fixed state of recovery, and when no such light duty employment is available to the employee 
from the employer, temporary disability benefits shall continue to be paid. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to in Chapters 1 and 2 of this title shall be 
determined by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 of each year, the total wages 
reported on contribution reports to the department of employment security under the 
commission for the preceding calendar year shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total insured workers reported for the preceding 
year by twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall be divided by 52, and the average 
weekly wage thus determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state average weekly wage 
as so determined shall be used as the basis for computing the maximum compensation rate for 
injuries or disabilities arising from occupational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 determination, and any death resulting 
therefrom. 
[Effective May 12, 1981-present.] 

APPENDIX 4 Utah Code Ann. Section 35-
1-65.1 '1990) Temporary 
Partial Disability 
J5-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments. 
Where the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during 
such disability for not to exceed 312 weeks over a period of not to exceed eight years from the date 
of the injury, compensation equal to 66%% of the difference between that employee's average weekly 
wages before the accident and the weekly wages that employee is able to earn thereafter, but not 
more than a maximum of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury per week and 
in addition thereto $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 
years, up to a maximum of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 100% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of injury per week. 
The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior 
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from such 
injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and who files an application 
for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year period. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends or the death of the injured 
employee. 
[Effective May 12, 1981-June30, 1988.] 
*1988 Amendment* 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly 
compensation equal to: 
(a) 66%% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the 
accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not 
more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, but only up to a total weekly 
compensation that does not exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of injury. 
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior 
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-99. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight 
years after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate when the disability ends or the 
injured employee dies. 
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990.] 
*1990 Amendment* 
35-1-65.1. Temporary partial disability — Amount of payments. 
(1) If the injury causes temporary partial disability for work, the employee shall receive weekly 
compensation equal to: 
(a) 66%% of the difference between the employee's average weekly wages before the 
accident and the weekly wages the employee is able to earn after the accident, but not 
more than 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of injury; plus 
(b) $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up 
to a maximum of four such dependent children, but only up to a total weekly 
compensation that does not exceed 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of injury. 
(2) The commission may make an award for temporary partial disability for work at any time prior 
to eight years after the date of the injury to an employee: 
(a) whose physical condition resulting from the injury is not finally healed and fixed eight 
years after the date of injury; and * 
(b) who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98. 
(3) The duration of weekly payments may not exceed 312 weeks nor continue more than eight 
years after the date of the injury. Payments shall terminate when the disability ends or the 
injured employee dies. (affg£7/>>/Z 4PX/£ J<? /4*a - /&>7) 
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APPENDIX 5 Utah Code Ann. Section 35-
1-66, (1990 & 1991) 
Permanent Partial 
Disability 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member Partial 
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the 
member This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4) 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as follows 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies 
of 500, 1000, 2000 and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric 
instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authonties in the field of measurement 
of hearing impairment Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 3000 cycles per second shall 
not be considered in determining compensable disability If the average decibel loss at 500, 1000, 
2000, and 3000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical professionals appointed 
by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the four frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, and 
3000 cycles per second which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average 
decibel loss To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for 
each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by V/2% up to the maximum of 100% 
which is reached at 92 decibels 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better 
ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six The 
resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss Compensation for permanent partial 
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural 
hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter Where an employee 
files one or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall 
be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission In no event shall compensation benefits 
be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits 
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided 
for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial disability compensation shall be awarded 
by the commission based on the medical evidence Compensation for any such impairment shall, as 
closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this section 
Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be 
considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function Permanent partial 
disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly 
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be paid 
[Effective July 1, 1988-April 22, 1990 ] 
*1990 Amendment* 
35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an industrial accident and 
who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may receive a permanent partial disability 
award from the commission 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or the death of the 
injured person 
102 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66%% of that employee's 
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 66%% of the state 
-zz weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week 
r
~- " ^~~
Mdent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
pendent children, but not to exceed 66%% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury per week, to be paid in routine pay periods not to exceed four weeks for the 
;ber of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the compensation 
provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial disability: 
For the loss of Number of Weeks 
(A) Upper extremity 
(aj An- * 218 
(b) Ar 18 7 
(c) A: ow joint, at elbow 
oi below elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon 178 
i) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon i f > H 
- .1 
i a ; At wns? vsT midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 1 K 
(b) All lingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joim> 101 
».T) Thumb. 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal jo;r_. . , ,aipometacai pal bone 
'
M
 At interphalangeal joint 50 
v finger 
i) A t metacarpophalangeal j oint or with resection of metacarpal bone * 2 
(b) At proxirr '.'. interphalangeal joint * 4 
A: distal interphalangeal joint. 18 
—ale linger 
. a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone, 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 
1
 c) At distal interphalangeal joint 
"~^ finger 
At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 
:) At distal interphalangeal joint 
(* Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone i 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal j oint , 1 
(B) Lower extremity 
{„; _ _emipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 5 6 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium 25 
(c) ibove knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes 
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less 
u
-°—\ ;"t.ercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd - 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial 
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the 
member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as follows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels with frequencies 
of 500, 1,000, 2,000 and 3,000 cycles per second (cps) using pure tone air conduction audiometric 
instruments (ANSI 1969) approved by nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement 
of hearing impairment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 3000 cycles per second shall 
not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average decibel loss at 500, 1,000, 
2,000, and 3,000 cycles per second is 25 decibels or less, usually no hearing impairment exists. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical professionals appointed 
by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear at the four frequencies 500, 1,000, 2,000, and 
3,000 cycles per second which shall be added together and divided by four to determine the average 
decibel loss. To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, the average decibel loss for 
each decibel of loss exceeding 25 decibels shall be multiplied by lVi% up to the maximum of 100% 
which is reached at 92 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss in the better 
ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer ear and dividing by six. The 
resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing loss. Compensation for permanent partial 
disability for binaural hearing loss shall be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural 
hearing loss by 100 weeks of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. Where an employee 
files one or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found to exist shall 
be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no event shall compensation benefits 
be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits. 
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided 
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for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial disability compensation shall be awarded 
by the commission based on the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment shall, as 
closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this section. 
Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be 
considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function. Permanent partial 
disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident. 
The amounts specified in this section are a, :w rations as to the maximum weekly 
amount payable as specified in this section, and h* .,^ v. >. *hu» .;*ore than a maximum of 66%% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be [ 
[Effective April _ • - ; 
*1991 Amendment* 
35-1-66, Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments. 
An employee who sustained a permanent impairment as a result of an indus1 id 
who files an application for hearing under Section 35-1-98 may receive a permanent tv 
award from the commission. 
Weekly payments may not in any case continue after the disability ends, or the death of the 
injured person. 
In the case of the following inji ; i : s the compensation she -j s 
average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than r . „^ -.ate 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less per week 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up io <i 
maximum of four dependent children, but not to exceed 66%% o" at 
the time of the injury p-%f ' pay period, 
number of" n~u~ T, t- iruiv^111 LiiciuuipcuM.^^ 
provided i ai uot - ^ ^~,v.«, ,....«
 y 
For the loss of Number of Weeks 
(A | Upper extremity 
Arm 
(a) " UK ,:,. *uluer (forequarter amputation) 218 
(b, it :>;.colder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) .Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint, 
•
alow elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon 178 
\^\ • ^ ^ ^ ^ 1 ^ ^ *>m0w joint distal r -< ^f-tton of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpa. .imp nation. 168 
(b) :gers except thumb at metacarpi eal joint:. 1 H 
(3) Thu.. 
{a ^ *• • - ^nhalanizeal icint or with resection of carpometacarpal bone 67 
(b, _
 tu.^,^j - 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a etacarpophalangeal joint or with resection or met., J. . ...42 
CI- " 1 interphalangeal joint ...34 
^phalangeal joint 18 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 34 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 15 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 17 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 13 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 8 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) 156 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes 
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less 
below intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump 88 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 16 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd - 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 4 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint 1 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation 120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye 100 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 109 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of the member. Partial 
loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete loss or loss of use of the 
member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the items listed in (B) (4). 
For any permanent impairment caused by an industrial accident that is not otherwise provided 
for in the schedule of losses in this section, permanent partial disability compensation shall be awarded 
by the commission based on the medical evidence. Compensation for any such impairment shall, as 
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closely as possible, be proportionate to the specific losses in the schedule set forth in this section. 
Permanent partial disability compensation may not in any case exceed 312 weeks, which shall be 
considered the period of compensation for permanent total loss of bodily function. Permanent partial 
disability compensation may not be paid for any permanent impairment that existed prior to an 
industrial accident. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the maximum weekly 
amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall more than a maximum of 66%% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be 
required to be paid. 
[Effective April 29, 1991-present.] 
35-2-58. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss due to noise to be compensated. 
Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful industrial noise shall be compensated 
according to the terms and conditions of this act. 
[Effective July 1, 1969-April 28, 1991.] 
*1991 Amendment (section renumbered)* 
35-1-66.1. Loss of hearing — Occupational hearing loss due to noise to be compensated. 
(1) Permanent hearing loss caused by exposure to harmful industrial noise or by direct head injury 
shall be compensated according to the terms and conditions of this chapter. 
(2) No claim for compensation for hearing loss for harmful industrial noise shall be paid under this 
chapter unless it can be demonstrated by a professionally controlled sound test that the 
employee has been exposed to harmful industrial noise as defined in Section 35-1-66.2 while 
employed by the employer against whom the claim is made. 
[Effective April 29, 1991-present.] 
35-1-66.2. Harmful industrial noise defined. 
(1) Harmful industrial noise is defined as the sound emanating from equipment and machines during 
employment exceeding the following permissible sound levels, dBA slow response, and 
corresponding durations per day, in hours: 
Sound Level 
90 
92 
95 
97 
100 
102 
105 
110 
115 
Durati* 
8 
6 
4 
3 
2 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
0.25 or 
(2) Harmful industrial noise is also defined as sound that results in acoustic trauma such as sudden 
instantaneous temporary noise or impulsive or impact noise exceeding 140 dB peak sound 
pressure levels. 
(3) The Utah Occupational Safety and Health Division of the commission may conduct tests to 
determine the intensity of noise at places of employment. The administrative law judge may 
consider such tests, and any other tests taken by authorities in the field of sound engineering, 
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Tab 6 
APPENDIX 6 Utah Code Ann. Section 35-
1-67, (1988 & 1994) 
Permanent Total Disability 
*1988 Repeal and Reenactment* 
Section 35-1-67 was repealed in 1988 and reenacted to read as follows: 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this 
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance 
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform 
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 6-%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
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(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum 
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b) 
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance 
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, 
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of 
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the 
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% 
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not 
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the 
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the 
vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education for rehabilitation 
training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), for use in the rehabilitation and 
training of the employee. 
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education certifies to the 
commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that agency in its 
efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not 
able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a hearing 
to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The 
parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order that the employee be 
paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined 
by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the death of the 
employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. In any 
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case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, 
but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for 
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the 
employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both 
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members, constitutes total and permanent 
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total 
disability is required in any such instance. 
[Effective July 1, 1988-July 14, 1988.] 
*Subsequent 1988 Amendment* 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this 
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance 
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform 
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum 
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b) 
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance 
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, 
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of 
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the 
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers' 
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Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% 
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not 
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the 
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education for 
rehabilitation training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), not to exceed 
$3,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee. 
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education 
certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that 
agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the 
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, 
hold a hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding 
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the 
evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order 
that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The 
period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with 
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady 
work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's 
rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the 
award shall be for permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to 
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under 
this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both 
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent 
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total 
disability is required in any such instance. 
[Effective July 15, 1988-April 28, 1991.] 
*1994 Amendment* 
-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation. 
(a) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
(b) Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the 
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations as revised. 
(c) The commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. 
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum 
established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee 
at the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection 
(2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest 
dollar. 
For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69 as in effect on the date of 
injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its 
insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 
weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability 
compensation. 
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(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer 
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. 
(4) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance 
carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or 
after the initial 312 weeks. 
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by 
the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has 
received compensation form the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any 
combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total 
disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the 
same period. 
(6) 
(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) the commission reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant 
to Title 35, Chapter 10, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a reemployment 
plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return 
the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier 
provides the commission notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not 
submit a plan; and 
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any 
reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under 
Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the commission shall order the initiation of permanent 
total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence. The 
commission shall order the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due 
the employee. The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability 
payments against its ultimate disability compensation liability under Chapter 1 or 2. 
(c) The commission may not order an employer or its insurance carrier to submit a 
reemployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan: 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation 
benefits, job placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment 
funded by the employer or its insurance carrier, 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for 
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the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process, 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. 
The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan shall be cause for the commission on its own motion to order a final finding of 
permanent total disability, 
(d) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the 
commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability 
compensation benefits. 
(7) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the 
death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the 
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by the commission, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless 
the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this title. 
(10) 
(a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, 
both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and 
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final. 
[Effective July 1, 1994-April 30, 1995.] 
Tab 7 
APPENDIX 7 Utah Code Ann. Section 35-
1-67, (1988 & 1994) 
Permanent Total Disability 
*1988 Repeal and Reenactment* 
Section 35-1-67 was repealed in 1988 and reenacted to read as follows: 
35-1-67, Permanent total disability — Amount of payments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this 
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance 
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform 
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 6-%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
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(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum 
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b) 
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance 
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, 
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of 
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the 
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% 
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not 
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the 
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the 
vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education for rehabilitation 
training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), for use in the rehabilitation and 
training of the employee. 
(b) If the vocational rehabilitation agency under the State Board of Education certifies to the 
commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that agency in its 
efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not 
able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a hearing 
to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding rehabilitation. The 
parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the evidence shows that 
successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order that the employee be 
paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as determined 
by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the death of the 
employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. In any 
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case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible, 
but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for 
permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the 
employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both 
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members, constitutes total and permanent 
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total 
disability is required in any such instance. 
[Effective July 1, 1988-July 14, 1988.] 
^Subsequent 1988 Amendment"1 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability - Amount of payments. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this 
chapter requires a finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance 
of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 
of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform 
to the substance of the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under 20 C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum 
established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at 
the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (b) 
shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69. The employer or its insurance 
carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, 
as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability 
compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of this compensation shall be 
reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and 
shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of 
compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its insurance 
carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. Notwithstanding the 
minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by the Employers' 
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Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% 
of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not 
final until all of the following proceedings have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and totally disabled, the 
commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, refer the employee to the Utah 
State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education for 
rehabilitation training. The commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68(1), not to exceed 
$3,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee. 
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for Vocational Education 
certifies to the commission in writing that the employee has fully cooperated with that 
agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the 
employee is not able to be rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, 
hold a hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding 
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a preponderance of the 
evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the commission shall order 
that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability compensation benefits. The 
period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with 
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady 
work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's 
rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some loss of bodily function, the 
award shall be for permanent partial disability. An employee is not entitled to 
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under 
this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both 
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent 
disability, to be compensated according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total 
disability is required in any such instance. 
[Effective July 15, 1988-April 28, 1991.] 
*1994 Amendment* 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation. 
(1) 
(a) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial accident, the employee shall 
receive compensation as outlined in this section. 
(b) Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a finding by the 
commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of the sequential decision-
making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of the Code of 
Federal Regulations as revised. 
(c) The commission shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. 
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)(1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement, 
compensation shall be 66%% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, 
limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at 
the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a 
dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not exceeding the maximum 
established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee 
at the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection 
(2)(b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest 
dollar. 
(3) For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or before June 30, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total 
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 35-1-69 as in effect on the date of 
injury. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7 in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its 
insurance carrier by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(d) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its insurance carrier, or 
the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 
weeks of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability 
compensation. 
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(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer 
or its insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 35-1-69. 
For claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in the course of the 
employee's employment on or after July 1, 1994: 
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation. 
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any 
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 35-1-65, 
35-1-65.1, 35-1-66, and 35-1-66.1 through 35-1-66.7, in excess of the amount of 
compensation payable over the initial 312 weeks at the applicable permanent total 
disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). 
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance 
carrier by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or 
after the initial 312 weeks. 
Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by 
the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has 
received compensation form the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any 
combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total 
disability compensation rate, shall be reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar 
amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the 
same period. 
(a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties, until: 
(i) the commission reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant 
to Title 35, Chapter 10, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act; 
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a reemployment 
plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return 
the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier 
provides the commission notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not 
submit a plan; and 
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise 
stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any 
reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under 
Subsection (6)(a)(ii). 
(b) Prior to the finding becoming final, the commission shall order the initiation of permanent 
total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's subsistence. The 
commission shall order the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due 
the employee. The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability 
payments against its ultimate disability compensation liability under Chapter 1 or 2. 
(c) The commission may not order an employer or its insurance carrier to submit a 
reemployment plan. If the employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan: 
(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation 
benefits, job placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment 
funded by the employer or its insurance carrier, 
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for 
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the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process, 
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. 
The employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment 
plan shall be cause for the commission on its own motion to order a final finding of 
permanent total disability, 
(d) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the 
commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability 
compensation benefits. 
(7) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally 
disabled, as determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with the 
death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work. 
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the 
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
(9) As determined by the commission, an employee is not entitled to disability compensation, unless 
the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under this title. 
(a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, 
both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and 
permanent disability, to be compensated according to this section. 
(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final 
[Effective July 1, 1994-April 30, 1995] 
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APPENDIX 8 Application for Hearing 
dated March 25, 1995, for 
July 1, 1990, Accident 
While Working for Siaperas 
Sand and Gravel 
Form 001 Revised 7/93 Industrial Commission of Utah - Adjudication, Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Botf l£6£lf «' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615'% '<• < " 
NOTE: PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT IN BLACK INK 
^b '* 
iVbc bdunml C O B U M M B 
*'i"i « f i te : 
Mcdkal 
fUlUpiC^TT t ACpOtt 
F - * FVwn* Report 
'/£ 
hMtfaefoUoww* 1 
a 
D 
a 
O^aawf *« *o»* * 1 he provided ^ » B^OL 
L * 1 
(I a l/ane/#• (burster 
Employee * 
Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used by Employee 
v. . 
Sfapsras Sot id a« J Grctscf 
Employer , 
Employer's Street Address . 
toff///^/** t/M 
City, State and Zip Code
 / 
Employer's Insuraiice Carrier (/ 
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35: 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
•Industrial Accident Claims Only9 
[NOTE: Include all supporting documentation U 
when this form is filed with the Industrial Commission.] O 
1. 
2. 
3. 
I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer on ^c//( I /??& ^ 
at the following location: C<? /-/*» k/Qoc/ &&/ / ^ / / ? f . *_ 
The accident occurred as follows: 0&0//<r0»f Jpf/f 0JfJfr*//i*?*/i'6 P Z FsS/* 4 
The injuries I sustained are: Dcof 
5. 
6. 
The injury caused time off work from to ; and 
#Jfyf?//Cft*<f fob fa** rfjf <ir<W# £r tssrfat/f /t'toQ 
I claim: [Mark an X in the appropriate space(s) and attach supporting documentation for each item marked - see reverse] 
A. / Medical Expenses 
B. j<^  Recommended Medical Care 
C. Higher Weekly Rate 
D. ^ Temporary Total Compensation H. ^ Travel Expenses 
E. Temporary Partial Compensation I. yt- Interest 
F. V Permanent Partial Compensation J. Other (Specify)_ 
G. Permanent Total Compensation 
My date of birth is 
working L/ct 
ct ~ D6 -r$~ . At the time of injury my wage was $ /S*~» <f<? per h 0u*^ ; and I was 
__ hours per week. Also, I w a s J H H i married and had A dependent children under age 
18 when I was injured. 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages.] 
> ?r~/y7r **//**/0. 6c*ry«r 
Printed Nime of Employee Tmtea Name or ninpioyee/^. ^s 
lipnatiire of Emnloveft C^ 
Signlture ofA£or&y forTsmploy 
Sig ature of ployee fir- 'W "? 
3S0 
Street nuwtvoo «f A^rnev for Employee 
Sec yf T1//// i t<M^n>/'SM 
City/State/Zip Code Telephone 
Street Address of Employee 
0"/*** (//*/ T9*rr/ 
City/State/Zip Code of Employee 
Employee's Telephone Number and Social Security Number 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S 
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM 
WILL BE FILED BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION 0 0 0 0 0 
00001 
DOCUMENT $ WCTCH MUST ACCOMPANY THIS FORM 
A. List all health care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) treated, date of 
treatment and nature of treatment. 
« ' ? ' ' 
B. Signed and notarized medical nuthonzation" - five more than total number of health care providers identified on the above list. . 
C. Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s). 
D. In permanent total disability claims only, copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of Administrative Law Judge or 
Appeals Council and/or Disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (form SS A 831-U5), if Social Security total disability has been 
awarded. 
E. If represented bv an attorney, completed and signed Appointment of Counsel Form. 
PERMANENT. TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY 
A. Date disability began: 
B. Age when disability began: Present age: 
C. Last grade completed in school: 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: 
E. English language difficulties: 
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties: 
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding employee's ability to return to work: 
H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application date - ; Award 
date - ; Current status of pending claim -
I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts: 
J. Names of Employers, years worked and description of work performed: 
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APPENDIX 9 Application for Hearing 
Dated March 25, 1996, for 
August 18, 1994, Accident 
While Working for JWR 
Construction Co. 
Industrial Commission of Utah - Adjudication Division 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor, P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
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Form 001 Revised 7/93 
Employee & 
Maiden Name and/or Other Name(s) Used by Employee 
v. 
$ "A , £ie • 
Employer 
y> h*S &<?#(/ 
Employer's'Street Address 
City, State ancTZip Code 
Employer's Insurance Carrier 
EMPLOYEE ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35: 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
•Industrial Accident9Clauib Only4 
[NOTE: Include all supporting documentation 
when this form is filed with the Industrial Commission.] 
1. I sustained an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment with the Employer on rftSKCf/' S*f 
/W6/ at the following location: Q/vr Crstfr / » / > / 
2. The accident occurred as follows: )t+f'x«l- S'y £*»#*/ *-&/*'»< 
3. 
4. 
The injuries I sustained are: bfafc f'»fi^fo "fa & ^ tfrfS^Sa//^ fft Ml$</*lr 
The injury caused time off work from 
C*tfJ?/ttr<htf~ 4>Crtx faff 
to ; and 
TT 
I claim: [Mark an X in the appropriate space(s) and attach supporting documentation for each item marked - see reverse] 
A. X Medical Expenses E._ 
B. /^ Recommended Medical Care F._ 
C. Higher Weekly Rate G.~ 
D. X Temporary Total Compensation H. £ Travel Expenses 
Temporary Partial Compensation L >C Interest 
pC Permanent Partial Compensation J. Other (Specify)_ 
Permanent Total Compensation 
My date of birth is fT " 90' ^ f At the time of injury my wage was $ /6-C<? per ^ * y ~ ; and I was 
working l/Cf hours per week- Also, I was iHHH married and had Ps dependent children under age 
18 when I was injured. 
Date: 
[If you need additional space to provide the information requested 
on either side of this form, you may attach additional pages*] 
v?f- rt 
/fa/tsrtfc 
Street Address of Attorney for Employee 
City/State/Zip Code Telephone 
/?*/£**/# S^yrr 
Printed^Name of Employee -, 
Signature of Employee 
j^JL 
: j 
* * * " ' 
Street Address of Employee ^ /??*,* CA? tvrs/ 
City/State/Zip Code of Employee 
Employee's Telephone Number and Social Security Number 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS, AND FORMS NOT INCLUDING EMPLOYEE'S 
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION AND INFORMATION REFERENCED ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM 
WILL BE FILED BUT RETURNED FOR COMPLETION 
00010 
DOCUMENTS WHICH MUST ACCOMPANY TPTS FORM 
A. List all health care providers who treated the worker during the last 15 years, and identify the body part(s) treated, date of 
treatment and nature of treatment. 
B. Signed an J notarized n*edickl authorizations - five more than total number of health care providers identified on the above list. 
N
 * r * c c » 
* * e * t *. c 
C. Copies of medical records summaries or medical documentation supporting claim(s). 
D. In permanent total di^bilivs claims only, copy of Social Security Award Certificate, Decision of Administrative Law Judge or 
Appeals Council and/or Disability Determination and Transmittal Sheet (form SSA 831-U5), if Social Security total disability has been 
awarded. " , ' , | j 
£. If represented bv an attorney, completed and signed Appointment of Counsel Form. 
PERMANENT. TOTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS ONLY 
A. Date disability began: 
B. Age when disability began: Present age: 
C. Last grade completed in school: 
D. Diplomas/degrees/special education classes: 
E. English language difficulties: 
F. Writing and/or reading difficulties^ 
G. Treating physician's opinion regarding employee's ability to return to work: 
H. Social Security Total Disability Award Information: Application date - ; Award 
date - ; Current status of pending claim -
I. Vocational rehabilitation efforts: 
J. Names of Employers, years worked and description of work performed: 
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Tab 10 
APPENDIX 10 Motion to Amend 
Application for Hearing 
and Join the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund dated 
August 28, 1996 
Hans M. Scheffler (4246) 
Attorney for Applicant 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ROLLAND A. BURGESS, 
Applicant, 
JWR CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO AMEND APPLICATION 
FOR HEARING AND JOIN THE 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
Case Nos. 96283 & 96284 
Judge Barbara A. Elicerio 
Comes now the applicant, and through his attorney, moves the Industrial 
Commission to allow him to amend his Applications for Hearing to include a claim for 
permanent total disability benefits as well as additional temporary total disability 
benefits and additional permanent partial disability benefits and to join the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund as a party to this claim. 
This motion is based upon the decisions of Avis v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) and Middlestadt v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). 
The Court in Middlestadt the Court of Appeal ruled that if an applicant knows 
his condition to be unstable at the end of the limitation period, he could have filed 
O01S2 
before the time period has run. 
In this case, the applicant and the defendants are aware of the ongoing 
problems and medical care he is receiving due to his back injuries. As the Court of 
Appeals stated in Avis v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 837 
at 588 "[t]he workers' compensation statute, however, does not require stabilization 
before filing for benefits." 
By analogy, the workers' compensation statute does not require an applicant 
to be total disabled before filing a claim for permanent total disability benefits. The 
only alternative remedy available to an injury worker is to timely file his claim. Id. 
WHEREFORE, the applicant respectfully moves to amend his Applications for 
Hearing to include a claim for permanent total disability benefits as well as additional 
temporary total disability benefits and additional permanent partial disability benefits 
and joining the Employers Reinsurance Fund as a party to this action. 
Dated this 28th day of August 1996. 
HansJVW^t^e« lar__. 
Attorney for Applicant 
2 
( M * i c>o 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand delivered 
to the fol lowing: 
Richard Sumsion, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Barbara Sharp, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P. 0 . Box 146611 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611 
Rolland A. Burgess 
P. 0 . Box 104 
Elmo, Utah 84521 
Dated this 28th day of August 1996. 
/ 
3 
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Tab 11 
APPENDIX 11 Motion to Continue Without 
Date the Applicant's Claim 
for Additional Benefits 
dated August 28, 1996 
Hans M. Scheffler (4246) 
Attorney for Applicant 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ROLLAND A. BURGESS, ] 
Applicant, 
v. 
JWR CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL and 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH 
Defendants. 
MOTION TO CONTINUE WITHOUT 
DATE THE APPLICANT'S CLAIM FOR 
I ADDITIONAL BENEFITS 
I Case Nos. 96283 & 96284 
Judge Barbara A. Elicerio 
Comes now the applicant, and through his attorney, moves the Industrial 
Commission to continue without date his claim for permanent total disability benefits, 
additional temporary total disability benefits and additional permanent partial disability 
benefits. This motion is based upon the fact that the applicant filed amended 
Applications for Hearing to preserve his claim for these additional benefits and to 
comply with the decisions of the Court of Appeals in Avis v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) and Middlestadt v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). 
1 
00185 
WHEREFORE, the applicant respectfully moves that his claim for additional 
benefits be continued without date. 
Dated this 28th day of August 1996. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand delivered 
to the following: 
Richard Sumsion, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Barbara Sharp, Esq. 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
Employers Reinsurance Fund 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
P. 0. Box 146611 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6611 
Rolland A. Burgess 
P. 0. Box 104 
Elmo, Utah 84521 
Dated this 28th day of Augustl^e^^—.^ 
2 
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Tab 12 
APPENDIX 12 Order on Motion to 
Amend dated November 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 96283 and 96284 
ROLLAND BURGESS, 
Applicant/Petitioner, 
vs. 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL 
/WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND 
OF UTAH AND JWR CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY/WORKERS COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
ORDER 
ON MOTION 
TO AMEND 
HEARING: 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 
28, 1996 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant/petitioner was represented by Hans 
Scheffler, Attorney. 
The respondent, Siaperas Sand & Gravel/Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, was represented by 
Barbara Sharp, Attorney. 
The respondent, JWR Construction/Workers 
Compensation Fund of Utah, was represented by 
Richard Sumsion, Attorney. 
On March 25, 1996, the applicant/petitioner filed two 
applications for hearing with the Industrial Commission, one with 
respect to a July 1, 1990 industrial accident and one with respect 
to an August 18, 1994 industrial accident. The 
applicant/petitioner indicated on the applications for hearing that 
he was claiming (in relevant part) medical expenses (accrued), 
recommended medical care (i.e. future medical expenses), temporary 
total compensation (TTC) and permanent impairment benefits (PPI) in 
connection with both accidents. The matter was set for hearing, 
but at the time of the hearing, or shortly thereafter, the TTC and 
PPI claims were settled and a compensation agreement was approved 
by the ALJ post-hearing, on October 28, 1996, documenting that 
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settlement. At hearing, the attorneys indicated that they wanted 
to discuss the claim for medical expenses, both past and future, 
and how the statue of limitations should apply to those expenses. 
This was done and at the conclusion of the hearing (treated 
essentially as an attorneys conference although the 
applicant/petitioner was available to testify) the claim for 
medical expenses was also settled. The discussions regarding the 
medical expense claim, and the resolution achieved with respect to 
that claim, is documented in a post-hearing letter that the ALJ 
sent to the parties (dated September 5, 1996). 
At the conclusion of the hearing on August 28, 1996, counsel 
for the applicant/petitioner submitted two motions with respect to 
amendment of the application for hearing. Because those motions 
were being submitted for the first time at the hearing, the ALJ 
allowed the respondents 30 days in which to respond in writing to 
those motions. The response was received at the Commission on 
September 27, 1996, and the matter was considered ready for an 
order on the motions at that time. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED: 
The first motion submitted by the applicant/petitioner is 
a Motion to Amend the applications for hearing to include claims 
for future TTC, PPI and permanent total disability benefits (PTD). 
The motion indicates that this request/motion was being made 
pursuant to two Court of Appeals cases, Avis v. Board of Review. 
837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), and Middlestadt v. Industrial 
Commission, 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). The 
applicant/petitioner suggests in his motion that these cases allow, 
and may require, the filing of applications for hearing prior to 
when an applicant/petitioner's claim is ready to be adjudicated. 
The second motion submitted by the applicant/petitioner 
indicates that the applicant/petitioner admits that the claims for 
future benefits are not ready to be adjudicated at this time and 
thus the motion seeks to have the amended application for hearing 
continued without date (apparently meaning held in abeyance by the 
Commission until such time as they are ready for adjudication). 
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The respondents have filed a joint response to the motions 
filed by the applicant/petitioner. The respondents argue that it 
is inappropriate to hold cases in abeyance, where there is no way 
of knowing when and if they will be ripe for adjudication and that 
the failure to prosecute these claims necessitates a dismissal of 
the claims. The respondents argue that the applicant/petitioner 
cannot enlarge the statue of limitations by having a case continued 
without date and asserts that the 6-year statute of limitations 
currently specified in U.C.A. 35-1-98 applies to bar any further 
claims on the applicant/petitioner's 1990 injury. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The ALJ understands how the Avis and Middlestadt cases have 
been interpreted by many to allow a tolling of at least some of the 
statutes of limitation found in the workers compensation laws. 
However, the ALJ has to admit that she simply does not understand 
what the court anticipated by those rulings. As is the case in 
much of the case law, Commission rules and even in the statute, the 
phrase "filing a claim" is used loosely without an indication 
regarding whether this means filing a claim for benefits with the 
carrier or filing an application for hearing with the Commission. 
The court in both Avis and Middlestadt refers to "filing for an 
increase," "filing for benefits, "file a compensation claim" but 
never indicates with whom these claims are to be filed and never 
refers to filing an application for hearing, which is the means of 
invoking Commission jurisdiction. Therefore, the ALJ cannot say 
that those cases reflect that filing an application for hearing, or 
amending an application for hearing with the Commission, is 
sufficient for tolling any certain filing limitation. In addition, 
both cases deal with laws different from the statue of limitations 
currently stated in U.C.A. 35-1-98 and thus it is uncertain if they 
apply to that statute. In short, the ALJ cannot say that allowing 
or disallowing the requested amendment in this case will have any 
effect whatsoever on the applicant/petitioner's ability to make 
future claims with respect to his 1990 or 1994 accident. 
Not withstanding the discussion above, the ALJ understands 
that some have interpreted the Avis and Middlestadt cases to 
require the filing of an application for hearing for certain 
benefits, before there is evidence of entitlement to those 
benefits, in order to prevent the statute of limitations from 
running. The ALJ understands that some attorneys even feel that it 
may be malpractice to fail to simply make the filing, just in case 
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it might toll the statute of limitations. Because the ALJ finds 
that the law is very unclear in this area at this time, the ALJ 
feels that she should allow the amendment to the claim, even though 
the effect of allowing the same is not settled. The application 
for hearing is therefore deemed amended to include a claim for 
future TTC, PPI and PTD. However, the ALJ is disinclined to 
continue the matter without date. The applicant/petitioner 
concedes there is currently no supportive evidence for these 
potential future claims and it is the Commission practice, or at 
least the practice of this ALJ to dismiss, without prejudice. 
applications for hearing that are not ready to be adjudicated. 
Therefore, the applicant/petitioner's amended application for 
hearing, claiming future TTC, PPI and PTD, is dismissed without 
prejudice. 
Once again, the ALJ must indicate that she takes no position 
on what effect, if any, the requested amendments have on the 
applicant/petitioner's right to claim future benefits related to 
his 1990 and 1994 injuries. His right to future benefits will be 
determined at the time that he makes those claims and they are 
ready to be adjudicated. The ALJ also takes no position on what 
statute of limitations applies to the 1990 and 1994 accidents as 
this area of the law remains unsettled in the appellate courts. 
The legislature continually amends the workers compensation laws 
without indicating whether or not the amendment is intended to be 
retroactive or not, leaving the retroactivity question related to 
each new amendment to be litigated. In addition, the statute of 
limitations may be different depending on the type of claim that 
the applicant/petitioner may make in the future. Considering the 
enormous questions involved with respect to what statute of 
limitations may apply to any future claim, the ALJ finds it best to 
leave this question open until such time as there is a concrete 
claim to be decided. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant/petitioner's 
MOTION TO AMEND APPLICATION FOR HEARING AND JOIN THE EMPLOYERS 
REINSURANCE FUND is granted and the applicant/petitioner's MOTION 
TO CONTINUE WITHOUT DATE THE APPLICANT'S CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL 
BENEFITS is denied. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the amended claim is dismissed 
without prejudice as there is no justiciable issue at this time. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Commission within 
thirty (3 0) days of the date hereof, specifying in detail the 
particular errors and objections, and, unless received by the 
Commission within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, this Order 
shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. If a Motion 
for Review is received by the Commission within thirty (3 0) days of 
the date hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed 
within fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion 
for Review by the Commission in accordance with U.C.A. Section 63-
46b-12. 
DATED this 22nd day of November, 1996. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
002U5 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of November, 1996,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order on Motion to Amend, in the case of Rolland Burgess v. Siaperas Sand 
& Gravel and WCFU: and JWR Construction Co. And WCFU. (Case Nos. 96283, 96284), 
to the following parties: 
POSTAGE PREPAID: 
ROLLAND A BURGESS 
PO BOX 104 
ELMO UT 84521 
HANS SCHEFFLER, ESQ 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET #380 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL: 
BARBARA W SHARP, ESQ. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
RICHARD SUMSION, ESQ. 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Kathy Houskeeper t O-r 
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APPENDIX 13 Order on Motions for 
Review dated June 9, 
1997 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ROLLAND BURGESS, * 
* ORDER ON MOTIONS 
Applicant, * FOR REVIEW 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL , * Case Nos. 96-0283 
JWR CONSTRUCTION CO. and * and 96-0284 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION * 
FUND OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
Each party in the above-entitled proceeding asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to 
review the Administrative Law Judge's decision regarding Rolland Burgess' claim for benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over these motion for review pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
May Mr. Burgess amend his applications for workers' compensation benefits to include 
possible future medical expenses and disability compensation? If Mr. Burgess is permitted to so 
amend his applications, are the applications subject to dismissal on the grounds they fail to raise a 
presently justiciable issue? 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Burgess was injured in two separate work accidents, the first on July 1, 1990 while 
employed by Siaperas Sand & Gravel, the second on August 18, 1994 while employed by JWR 
Construction. On March 25, 1996, Mr. Burgess filed two applications seeking workers' 
compensation benefits for his injuries from the two accidents. 
Prior to the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Burgess' claims, the two employers and their 
workers' compensation insurance carrier, The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, accepted 
liability for Mr. Burgess' medical expenses and disability compensation with respect to his then-
existing condition. On August 28, 1996, Mr. Burgess moved to amend his applications for hearing 
to include a claim for future benefits that might arise as a result of his work injuries. 
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The ALJ permitted Mr. Burgess to amend his applications to include claims for future 
workers' compensation benefits. The ALJ then dismissed such claims without prejudice on the 
grounds they were not ripe for adjudication . 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
WCF argues the ALJ erred in allowing Mr. Burgess to add claims for possible future 
workers' compensation benefits to his current applications for hearing. However, after the ALJ 
permitted Mr. Burgess to amend his applications, the ALJ dismissed the applications because they 
had not yet ripened, and might never ripen, into any justiciable claim. When the amended 
applications were dismissed, the alleged error in allowing amendment of the applications became 
moot. Consequently, the Industrial Commission will not consider such objections further. 
Mr. Burgess argues it was error for the ALJ to dismiss his amended applications. Although 
Mr. Burgess concedes that, at this time, he has received all the workers' compensation benefits to 
which he is entitled, he contends that unless his applications for hearing remain open, his right to 
future benefits may be extinguished by the statute of limitations found in §35-1-98 of the Act. In 
the Industrial Commission's opinion, Mr. Burgess misapprehends the effect of §35-1-98 of the Act. 
It is a fundamental principle of Utah's workers' compensation system that the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act is to be interpreted liberally to effectuate its "beneficent and humane objects". 
North Beck Mining Co. V. Industrial Commission. 58 Utah 486,200 P. 111 (1921). In furtherance 
of such purposes, §35-1-78(1) of the Act grants the Industrial Commission continuing jurisdiction 
over workers' compensation cases: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be 
continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify 
or change its former findings and orders. 
The Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction is not unbridled. The Industrial 
Commission can modify a workers' compensation award only when there is a significant change, 
new development, or proof of the inadequacy of the previous award. Spencer v. Industrial 
Commission. 733 P.2d 158 (Utah 1987). Furthermore, the Industrial Commission's continuing 
jurisdiction is subject to the limitations found in §35-1-78(3) of the Act: 
(a) This section1 may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the 
statute of limitations contained in other sections of this chapter or Title 35, Chapter 
2, Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
1
 Referring to the section granting continuing jurisdiction to the Industrial Commission. 
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(b) The commission has no power to change the statutes of limitation referred 
to in Subsection (3)(a) in any respect. 
It is therefore necessary to examine the specific language of the statute of limitations 
applicable to claims for workers' compensation disability. That statute of limitations is found in 
§35-1-98 of the Act: 
(2) A claim for compensation for temporary total disability benefits, temporary 
partial disability benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total 
disability benefits is barred, unless an application for hearing is filed with the 
commission within six years after the date of the accident. (Emphasis added.) 
Under the foregoing statute, the limitation period is tolled if an application for hearing is 
filed within six years after the date of the accident. In this case, Mr. Burgess has filed an application 
for hearing within the applicable six year period. Furthermore, by agreement of the parties, he 
already has been determined eligible for some benefits under the workers' compensation system. 
Consequently, by virtue of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction and the plain 
language of §35-1-98(2), the Industrial Commission may exercise continuing jurisdiction over Mr. 
Burgess' claim if he proves that a significant change has occurred in his condition. 
In light of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction in this case, it is unnecessary 
to hold Mr. Burgess' applications for hearing open. Instead, Mr. Burgess may request that the 
Industrial Commission reopen the matter if future developments warrant such a request.2 
In reaching the foregoing conclusion, the Industrial Commission has carefully considered 
the Utah Court of Appeals' decisions in Avis v. Bd. of Review. 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) and 
Middlestad v. Industrial Commission. 852 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993). However, in neither case 
did the court consider the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction under §35-1-78(1) of the 
Act.3 The Industrial Commission also notes the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Stoker v. The 
Workers' Compensation Fund. 889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994), in which the Court suggests the 
Industrial Commission retains continuing jurisdiction in cases such as this. 
In summary, the Industrial Commission concludes that because the issue raised in WCF's 
motion for review is moot, no purpose is served by considering the matter further. The Industrial 
2
 Of course, at such time, Mr. Burgess will be required to "overcome the substantial issues of 
causation" that may then exist. Stoker v. Industrial Commission. 889 P.2d 409,412 (Utah 1994). 
3
 The Industrial Commission notes that the parties neither raised nor briefed the issue of the 
Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction in either Avis or Middlestadt. 
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Commission further concludes that, in light of the Industrial Commission's continuing jurisdiction 
to consider Mr. Burgess' right to additional benefits when and if such rights accrue, there is no need 
to hold Mr. Burgess' current applications open. Consequently, the ALJ properly dismissed such 
applications. 
ORDER 
On the grounds stated herein, the Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and 
denies both Mr. Burgess' and WCF's motions for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this #ji}day of June, 1997. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request 
for reconsideration must be received by the Industrial Commission within 20 days of the date of this 
order. Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a 
petition for review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 
30 days of the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILTNG 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order On Motions For Review in the matter of Rolland 
Burgess, Case No.96-0283 & 96-0284 was mailed first class postage prepaid this^/ffi day of June, 
1997, to the following: 
BARBARA W. SHARP 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
P O BOX 57929 
MURRAY, UTAH 84157 
HANS M. SCHEFFLER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
311 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 380 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
ROLLAND A. BURGESS 
P O BOX 104 
ELMO, UTAH 84521 
SIAPERAS SAND & GRAVEL 
6135 EAST NORTH COAL CREEK 
WELLINGTON, UTAH 84501 
JWR CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
PO BOX 1410 
HUNTINGTON, UTAH 84528 
si£is*JL& ~hM/M 
Adell Butler^Mttchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
ordcrs\96-0283 
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APPENDIX 14 United States 
Smelting, Refining 
and Mining Co. v. 
Nielsen, 
430 P.2d 162 (Utah 
1967) 
UNITED STATES SMELTING, REFINING AND MINING COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Paul D. NIELSEN, and the Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Defendants 
No. 10703 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
430P.2d162, 19 Utah 2d 239 
July 5, 1967 
COUNSEL 
Marr, Wilkins & Cannon, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Phil L. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
JUDGES 
HENRIOD, Justice, wrote the opinion. 
CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
AUTHOR: HENRIOD 
OPINION 
HENRIOD, Justice. 
Appeal from an Industrial Commission award. Reversed. 
Applicant, Nielsen, after working for the Smelting Company for 10 days, was injured by a 
cave-in in 1952. Among other things he injured his knee. The company, as self-insurer, paid 
statutory compensation for a period of time under Sec. 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953,1 
which provided for payment upwards of six years from the date of the injury. After he had been 
paid compensation periodically for a time under the statute, Nielsen requested and received a 
lump sum settlement of his claim in order to go into private business, which he did, and which he 
pursed until 1965, when he had his knee cap removed, in the process of which he suffered partial 
paralysis of his hands and arms because of operative or post-operative faulty blood circulation. 
He filed a claim for further compensation, and an award was made apparently because of the 
decision of this Court in Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission,^ which decision cited 
Hardy v. Industrial Commission, 3 as a precedent for the proposition that the date when 
compensation accrues is that date when disability occurs, i.e., on a casualty, not a calendar year 
basis, - or, in other words, upon discovery of an injury. The Apex observations with respect to 
this were distum based on the Hardy decision, but the law of the Apex case strictly was based on 
an estoppel. 
The Hardy case was decided in 1936 under the partial disability statute then existing,"* 
whose wording was as follows: 
Where the injury causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive during such 
disability, and for a period of not to exceed six years, etc. * * *. 
At that time the temporary disability statute that immediately preceded the above section, 5 
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read as follows: 
* * * In no case shall such compensation continue for more than six years from the date of 
the injury * * *. 
In 1939 the legislature amended the section on partial disability to read as follows:^ 
* * * the employee shall receive, during such disability, and for a period of not to exceed six 
years from the date of injury, etc. * * *. 
The Hardy case did not discuss the temporary disability statute, apparently because, although 
Mr. Hardy seemed to have been temporarily disabled as well as partially disabled, the court 
considered that the wording of the temporary disability statute represented a true limitations 
statute, rendering uncompensable any disability developed more than six years after the date of 
the injury, or accident. * 
It seems inescapable to conclude other than that the 1939 legislature intended to meet the 
interpretation of the Hardy case by clearing up the question as to time when a claim must be 
presented, and to indicate that when an industrial accident occurs on a certain date, any disability 
resulting therefrom is compensable during six years after such accident occurred, and to make 
uniform the partial disability and temporary disability sections as to duration of payment of 
compensation. 
It seems significant that the Apex case did not decide the issue posed in the Hardy case, and 
that there appears to be no Utah case to date that has or could have followed the latter case after 
the 1939 amendment, except on some rare occasion, such as voluntary conferral of authority to 
decide a matter as appears to be the case in Apex. 
It seems significant also that in McKee v. Industrial Commission? in a case involving the 
filing of a claim within three years** which provides that: 
"If no claim for compensation is filed with the Industrial Commission within three years from 
the date of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to 
compensation shall be wholly barred,'1 
the author had this to say: 
"Regardless of the decisions rendered by this court prior to 1939, the law now is that the 
limitation statute begins to run from the date of the accident or from the date of the last payment 
of compensation." 
In a concurring opinion in the Apex case, Mr. Justice Wolfe had this to say: 
"Furthermore, there are comparatively few cases where disability arises more than three years 
after the accident or recurs three years after the last payment. And as to those cases the statute 
was meant to provide for a period after which the insurance carrier could safely cease to carry 
reserves against a definite accident. The matter of whether an over-all period of three years is too 
short is for the legislature. There will undoubtedly be cases of hardship where an man will 
suffer a residual disability from an old injury." 
We agree with both of these quotations and can see no difference in logic, philosophy or 
legislative intent since 1939, as to the six-year limitation. 
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Defendant in this case say that Sec. 42-1-72, Utah Code Annotated 1943 (35-1-78, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953) overrides the six-year limitation statutes when it says that: 
"The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it 
may from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or 
orders with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified." 
We have no quarrel with the above statute, but construe it to mean the commission has 
continuing jurisdiction only during the period of the limitations statutes mentioned above,^ and 
has nothing to do with the abrogation of or exception to such limitations statutes. Our conclusion 
about legislative intent seems to be borne out by Sec. 35-1-78, U.C.A. 1953, which allows for 
destruction of records after 10 years, at the discretion of the Commission. 
We think the review in this case is well taken for several reasons: 1) the Apex case is not 
pertinent; 2) the three-year limitations statute is applicable; 3) the six-year statute is applicable, 
if, for no other reason than that Nielsen, in accepting the lump sum settlement at his own instance 
and request, did so in exchange for and in lieu of any six-year compensation to which he would 
be entitled, thus exhausting his claim; 4) that the three and six-year statutes are ones of repose, 
which we think the legislature intended should terminate, not encourage protraction of claims, -
otherwise, an employer could and would be an insurer for the natural lives of its employees, 
based on real or imaginary discoveries of erstwhile latent injuries; 5) that the Workmen's 
compensation Laws were and are designed to provide sustenance to a family for a statutory time 
until it can become readjusted in industry; and 6) that Nielsen, in his own application set both the 
date of injury and disability at the same time, so that really there is no problem as to dates of 
accident, disability or discovery. 
CROCKETT, C.J., and CALLISTER and TUCKETT, JJ., concur. 
DISSENT 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
In this case Paul D. Nielsen sustained a compensable injury in 1952. He was awarded 
compensation at the rate of $30.25 per week for a period of 124 3/7 weeks. The payment for the 
last 54 weeks was discounted at 3 per cent compounded annually and paid to him in a lump sum. 
Almost 13 years later the old injury to his knee flared up, and he had his knee cap removed, 
along with other operative procedures on his leg, on April 12, 1965. The plaintiff herein paid the 
expenses of that operation. However, complications arose because of the operation, and he has 
sustained ulnar injuries amounting to 13 per cent of the total man. The testimony before the 
Industrial Commission warranted a finding that the ulnar disorder resulted from the knee 
operation, and the knee operation was a result of the compensable injury sustained in 1952. At a 
hearing on May 4, 1966, the Industrial Commission ordered the plaintiff herein to pay 24 weeks 
additional payments of $30.25 each. 
Before the Commission the plaintiff denied liability because, among other things, the statute 
of limitations had run and the Commission exceeded its authority in making the order. 
The question we have to determine then is the interpretation we should place upon Section 
35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated 1953, which so far as material here was Section 42-1-62, Utah 
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Code Annotated 1943. That section in substance provides: "Where the injury causes partial 
disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such disability, and for a period of not to 
exceed six years from the date of the injury, a weekly compensation * * *." 
A similar matter was before the Supreme Court in the case of Utah Apex Mining Company, 
et al. v. Industrial Commission, et al. 116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571. In that case one Peterson 
sustained injuries on May 20, 1931, while an employee of the Utah Apex Mining Company. 
There was a dispute as to whether or not the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction to make an 
award. That dispute was not material to the part of the case in which we are now interested. 
Petersen continued in the employ of Utah Apex Mining Company until 1938 and submitted 
himself to a doctor generally once a month. The doctor testified that the leg was never entirely 
free from infection during any of this period. On December 29, 1947, the doctor informed the 
Utah Apex Mining Company that he had hospitalized Peterson because of osteomyelitis of the 
left leg and that this condition was a residual of the original injury. 
The Utah Apex Mining Company contended that the Industrial Commission could not act in 
the matter because Petersen's right was barred under the provision of Section 42-1-61, R.S.U. 
1933, which statute applied to the recovery of temporary disability and so far as material reads as 
follows: "In case of temporary disability the employee shall receive 60 per cent of his average 
weekly wages so long as such disability is total * * *. In no case shall such compensation 
continue for more than six years from the date of the injury." 
At page 311 of the 116 Utah Reports, at page 574 of 209 P.2d this court said: 
Section 42-1-61 must be read in the light of 42-1-72 R.S.U. 1933. That statute provides that 
the jurisdiction of the Commission in compensation cases shall be continuing without mention of 
any period of time after which that jurisdiction shall come to an end. That statute provides: 
The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing, and it may 
from time to time make such modification or change with respect to former findings, or orders 
with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be justified. 
The case of Hardy v. Industrial Commission, 89 Utah 561, 58 P.2d 15, 17, is instructive of 
the manner in which these sections are to be resolved. In that case it was urged that under 
42-1-62, R.S.U. 1933, the Commission lost jurisdiction upon the expiration of six years from the 
date of the injury. The principal difference between that statute and the section preceding it, 
which is the statute here involved, is that Section 62 announces the law applicable in cases of 
partial disability whereas Section 61 covers cases of temporary disability. However, the statutes 
are, in substance, identical when we limit our consideration to the provision that payment of 
compensation shall not continue for more than six years from the date of the injury. Inasmuch as 
this is the only provision in either statute with which we are here concerned, the reasoning of this 
court in that case is applicable here. We there held that the provision that payment of 
compensation should not continue for more than six years from the date of the injury was only 
meant to fix the period during which payment is to extend, that is, the disability period, and that 
it was not in conflict with 42-1-72, supra, which provides that the jurisdiction of the Commission 
shall be continuing. We there said: 
We discover no conflict between section 42-1-62 and section 42-1-72, supra. The latter 
section is one relating to jurisdiction only. The former relates to the amount to be paid and the 
period during which the payment shall extend. "Where the injury causes partial disability for 
work, the employee shall receive during such disability and for a period of not to exceed six 
years" the compensation provided for by the statute. Reading the whole section, it is apparent the 
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part under consideration and last above quoted has the same effect and meaning as though it 
read: "When the injury causes partial disability for work, the employee shall receive, during such 
disability * * * not to exceed six years, the compensation specified." 
The limitation provided by the section relates to the disability period and not the calendar 
period dating from the injury. 
The facts in the case of Hardy v. Industrial Commission cited above are as follows: 
Hardy sustained a compendable injury on October 25, 1927. His insurance carrier assumed 
liability and paid compensation including the necessary medical expenses incurred in healing the 
injury. At the conclusion of the period of temporary disability and at the time applicant was 
discharged, it was recommended by the attending physician that a further operation be 
performed. The insurance carrier agreed at that time, to wit, during the winter of 1929 and 1930, 
to pay the costs of such operation ordered to be performed. However, the operation was not 
performed at that time and was not called to the attention of either the employer or its insurance 
carrier until more than six years had elapsed after the initial injury and only after the application 
had gone to another surgeon and had the operation performed. The insurance carrier was then 
requested to pay for the operation and other medical care incident to the operation. Hardy made 
application for further compensation, all of which was after the elapse of more than six years 
from the date of the injury. 
The insurance carrier denied liability and claimed that Section 42-1-62, R.S.U. 1933, which 
is now 35-1-66, U.C.A. 1953, prevented the Commission from making an award after the 
expiration of six years from the date of the injury. 
In disposing of the contention, this court at page 567 of the Utah Reports, at page 17 of 58 
P.2d used the following language: 
It would be an unusual construction to say that an employee injured by accident in the course 
of his employment should be denied compensation because an injury had apparently been 
surgically cured, but which was in fact quiescent for a period and without an additional injury, 
but, in the course of progress of the injury, it again became a disability precluding remunerative 
employment, that the employee should be denied compensation for the subsequent period. Some 
injuries apparently only temporary become permanent, and disabling injuries for a period may be 
partial and then become total. Injuries thought to be total may become temporary and even 
complete recovery may result. * * * 
In the instant case, the application and the hearing thereon, acceptance of liability by the 
carrier placed the matter under the jurisdiction of the commission, and whether there were 
express findings or an award or not, the commission had power and jurisdiction to make or deny 
an award as the merits of the case might determine. It is just as important that the commission 
should have an opportunity to reconsider its findings or to make findings if the making of 
findings has been temporarily unnecessary because of agreement as it is to review and consider 
its findings on a previous award when new conditions required the exercise of the continuing 
jurisdiction conferred by the statute. 
In that case the Industrial Commission had refused to make an award because it assumed the 
position now taken by the plaintiff herein. The order of the Industrial Commission was vacated, 
and the cause was remanded for further proceedings. 
I think these two cases dispose of the contention made by plaintiff and require us to hold that 
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the six-year limitation is a limitation upon the number of payments which can be made to an 
injured workman and has nothing to do with when payments must be stopped. To hold otherwise 
would lead to a unique situation if the injury was not disabling for a period of five years, and by 
the time the hearings were terminated the six-year period would have passed. Such could not 
have been in contemplation of the Legislature in enacting the statute. 
It should also be noted that the Industrial Commission has interpreted the statute involved 
herein to mean casualty years and not a period of limitation, and since this holding of the 
Commission has been continuous for some 27 years, the Legislature by not changing this statute 
would have given its tacit approval to the interpretation placed thereon by the Commission. Of 
course, if the holding of the Commission was clearly at variance with the law, we would not 
hesitate to strike it down, although long acquiescence might have been given to the 
interpretation. In this case I think the interpretation placed by the Commission is correct, and the 
order of the Commission should be affirmed. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 See prior statutes, leading up to the Section: Sec. 42-1-62, Utah code Annotated 1943 and 1933. 
2 116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571 (1949). 
3 89 Utah 561, 58 P.2d 15 (1936). 
4 Sec. 42-1-62, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933. 
5 Sec. 42-1-61, Revised Statutes of Utah 1933. (Sec. 35-1-65, U.C.A. 1953). 
6 Chap. 51, Laws of Utah 1939. (Sec. 42-1-62, Utah Code Annotated, 1943). 
7 115 Utah 550, 206 P.2d 715 (1949). 
8 Sec. 42-1-92, Utah Code Annotated 1943; Jones v. Industrial Commission, 17 Utah 2d 28, 404 P.2d 
27(1965). 
9 West's Ann. Calif. Codes, Labor, Sec. 5410. 
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Kyle Stoker, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
The Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah and the Industrial 
Commission for the State of Utah, Defendants and 
Appellees 
No. 920386 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
889 P.2d 409, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
December 2, 1994, Filed 
Second District, Weber County. The Honorable David E. Roth. 
COUNSEL 
Martin W. Custen, James R. Hasenyager, Patrick F. Holden, Ogden, for plaintiff. 
Dennis v. Lloyd, James R. Black, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
JUDGES 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Christine M. Durham, Justice, Gregory 
K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge. Zimmerman, Chief Justice, concurs in the result. Orme, Court of 
Appeals Judge, sat to fill the vacancy on the Court. 
AUTHOR: STEWART 
OPINION 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Kyle Stoker filed a complaint in the district court seeking a ruling that Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-65(1) of the Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") is unconstitutional under Article I, Section 
11 of the Utah Constitution insofar as it provides that no temporary total disability benefits may 
be paid after eight years from the time of an injury-causing accident. The district court held the 
provision constitutional, and Stoker appeals. 
Stoker injured his lower back on October 13, 1982, and again on November 15, 1982, while 
working for a construction company as a laborer. His back condition deteriorated, and surgery 
was performed on January 13, 1987. The Industrial Commission awarded Stoker temporary total 
disability benefits in the amount of $ 4,788.76 for an approximately 22-week period from 
December 24, 1986, through May 24, 1987. The Commission also awarded Stoker partial 
disability benefits in the amount of $ 6,627.85, medical expenses, and attorney fees. 
After his surgery, Stoker's back condition continued to deteriorate. In May 1990, less than 
eight years from the date of his injury, Stoker's treating physician advised the Workers' 
Compensation Fund ("Fund") that because of chronic unrelenting pain, Stoker should be 
evaluated for spinal fusion surgery. However, Stoker and his doctor decided first to try the more 
conservative treatment provided by a pain clinic program to try to avoid surgery. The Fund 
authorized and paid for that therapy, but it was unsuccessful. In January 1991, Stoker underwent 
a spinal fusion. 
Stoker applied for additional temporary total disability benefits for the period relating to the 
second surgery. The Commission denied the application based on the eight-year time limitation 
on temporary total disability benefits in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-65(1). In pertinent part, that 
section states: "In no case shall such [temporary total disability] compensation benefits exceed 
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312 weeks at the rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury over a 
period of eight years from the date of the injury. ,f (Emphasis added.) Under this provision, 
temporary total disability benefits are subject to three limitations: (1) they are payable only for a 
maximum of 312 weeks (2) at a rate of 100% of the state average weekly wage, and (3) the 
benefits must be paid within eight years of the date of the injury, even if they have been paid to 
an injured worker for less than 312 weeks when the eight-year period expires. 
Stoker argues that the eight-year period violates the Due Process and Open Courts provisions 
in Article 1, Sections 7 and 11, respectively, of the Utah Constitution because the limitation is an 
unconstitutional statute of repose under Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
1985), and Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), or an unconstitutional cap on damages under the ruling in 
Condemarin v. University Hospital, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
The Fund argues that the eight-year provision is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute 
of repose because it does not totally bar compensation. Rather, the Fund argues, the provision 
limits only the total amount of temporary total disability benefits and the time within which an 
injured worker can receive such benefits, whether the benefits claimed are the total allowable or 
less than the total allowable. The Fund also states that such benefits are part of an array of 
remedies provided by the Act, some of which can continue indefinitely. See Kennecott Copper 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 597 P.2d 875, 877 (Utah 1979); see also Utah Code Ann. § 
35-1-99(2) (1988). 
Because Stoker failed to present to the trial court his due process claim and the claim that the 
limitations in § 35-1-65(1) constitute an unconstitutional cap on damages, we decline to address 
those claims. We therefore address only the claim that § 35-1-65(1) is an unconstitutional statute 
of repose. 
The Workers' Compensation Act is a comprehensive statutory scheme that provides remedies 
for injuries to workers occurring in the course of their employment, irrespective of fault, in lieu 
of common law tort actions. The Act provides temporary total disability benefits, § 35-1-65; 
temporary partial disability benefits, § 35-1-65.1; permanent partial and permanent total 
disability benefits, § 35-1-81; and medical expenses for injured employees, § 35-1-81, as well as 
certain other benefits. These remedies, whether viewed individually or together, are not 
analogous to an ordinary lump-sum judgment that the common law provides for personal injury 
actions. Not only may benefits be paid over a period of time rather than in a lump-sum judgment, 
but an award of benefits does not generally have the res judicata effect of a judgment. 
While it is not clear why the Legislature imposed both a 312-week limitation and an 
eight-year limitation on temporary total disability benefits, we presume that those provisions are 
constitutional. Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 580 (Utah 1993); Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 
P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1991); Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 819 (Utah 
1991). They clearly are not facially unconstitutional under Berry and its progeny. It is the 
burden of one attacking the constitutionality of a statutory provision to demonstrate that the 
provision is unconstitutional. 
Whether a statute that bars or terminates a claim for relief is a statute of limitations or a 
statute of repose depends on the nature of the statute and the manner in which it operates to cut 
off the legal right of a person to obtain a remedy for an injury. Gaufin, 867 P.2d at 575-76; see 
also Berry, 717 P.2d at 672; Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1158-59 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994); Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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Although § 35-1-65 might act to cut off a claim a worker may have for temporary total disability 
benefits and possibly raise a constitutional issue under Berry, 1 that is not the case here. 
In this case, § 35-1-65 did not operate as a statute of repose. The eight-year bar did not 
preclude Stoker from asserting a claim for temporary total disability benefits. In fact, he did 
assert a claim. He received such benefits from December 24, 1986, through May 24, 1987. He 
could even have received a second award of such benefits for temporary total disability resulting 
from surgery for a condition causally connected to his industrial accident if he had known of the 
necessity for additional medical treatment and had undergone the surgery prior to the expiration 
of the eight-year period. 
Stoker must have known that a spinal fusion would result in a period of temporary total 
disability. He lost the right to file a second time for temporary total disability benefits as a result 
of his choice of the type of treatment he wanted to undertake within the limited time left under 
the statute. The eight-year limitation barred his remedy because of the choice he made. That kind 
of bar does not operate as a statute of repose under Berry and its progeny. See Gaufin, 867 P.2d 
at 576. 
Nevertheless, Stoker may still have a remedy under the Act. It would be ironic for the Act to 
be construed in such a fashion that a worker who undertakes a conservative course of therapy 
within the time allowed by the statute, which if effective would save the Fund money and be less 
risky to the worker, would be denied benefits when that course proves ineffective and a more 
aggressive therapy must then be pursued, resulting in temporary total disability that occurs 
outside the eight-year period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken at the time of the 
less aggressive therapy, Stoker would have met the requirements for additional total disability 
benefits. 
The Industrial Commission and the Fund both seem to recognize as much in their brief. They 
state: 
For the purposes of WCF's Brief and for that purpose only WCF concedes the plaintiff 
experienced a period of temporary total disability related to his industrial accident of 
October 13, 1982, while employed by Big D Construction Company more than eight 
years after his industrial accident. Plaintiff should be put to his burden of proof before the 
Industrial Commission of Utah to prove that any continuing problem is reasonably related 
to his industrial accident. 
The brief then states, "The Commission has continuing jurisdiction to modify its prior award 
herein pursuant to Section 35-1-78 U.C.A."2 Section 35-l-78(3)(b) provides, however, that "the 
commission has no power to change the [applicable] statutes of limitations." In short, Stoker may 
ask the Commission to reopen and modify its prior award if Stoker can overcome the substantial 
issues of causation that exist. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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Gregory K. Orme, Court of Appeals Judge 
Zimmerman, Chief Justice, concurs in the result. 
Orme, Court of Appeals Judge, sat to fill the vacancy on the Court. 
DISPOSITION 
Affirmed. 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 See also Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Wrolstad v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 786 P.2d 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2 Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78(1) provides in part: "The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over 
each case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice and hearing, may from time to time modify or 
change its prior findings and orders." 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michic, a division of Rccd Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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BENCH, Judge: 
JUDGES 
OPINION 
Petitioner, Paul J. Middlestadt, seeks review of the Industrial Commission's denial of his 
request for additional temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits 
pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Middlestadt was injured in industrial accidents occurring in 1976 and in 1980. In 1985, he 
was awarded temporary total disability benefits and permanent partial disability benefits. 
Middlestadt subsequently underwent two operations (one in 1987 and one in 1990) that were 
necessitated by the industrial accidents. In 1991, Middlestadt filed for additional temporary total 
disability benefits and additional permanent partial disability benefits based on his condition 
following the operations. 1 
Middlestadt's claims were dismissed sua sponte by an administrative law judge. Middlestadt 
appealed to the Industrial Commission and the dismissal was affirmed.^ The Industrial 
Commission held that the claims were barred under the eight year "statutes of limitation'1 found 
in Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-65 and -66 (1977).3 Middlestadt petitioned this court to review the 
Industrial Commission's ruling. 
ANALYSIS 
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Middlestadt asserts that the limitations upon his ability to file a claim found in sections 
35-1-65 and -66 violate the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. 
I, § l l . 4 Middlestadt relies upon Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), 
claiming that the statutory limitations unconstitutionally require him to file a claim before it has 
accrued. He asserts that his claims did not accrue until after the operations in 1987 and 1990. 
Consequently, the key issue in this case is whether Middlestadt's claim accrued at the time of the 
industrial accidents or when he had the operations. 
I his court recently held in Avis v. Industrial Commission, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992) 
cert, denied, No. 920559 (Utah Feb. 24, 1993) (interpreting a similar statute of limitation found 
in section 35-1-99), that a worker's cause of action accrues when the industrial accident occurs. A 
statute requiring filing within a set period following the accident is therefore a statute of 
limitation, not a statute of repose. Id. at 587-88. 
In Avis, this court expressly rejected a proposed rule that a statute of limitation not run until 
the petitioner "discovered" the full extent of his injury. Id. at 588. Middlestadt makes the same 
argument in this case, urging that the statutes of limitation found in sections 35-1-65 and -66 
should not begin to run until he knows the full extent of his injury, i.e., until after his subsequent 
operations. He has not, however, shown why the analysis set forth in Avis regarding section 
35-1-99 should not apply with equal force to sections 35-1-65 and -66. We find the Avis analysis 
applicable here. 
Middlestadt has not presented any argument that the statutes, as applied to him, are 
unconstitutional. He knew of his accident within the eight-year limitation period, and his first 
operation occurred within the period. He did not, however, seek to amend his award until after 
the time periods had run. Our conclusion that his claim is time-barred is not altered by the fact 
that his second operation occurred after the time period had run. If Middlestadt knew that his 
condition was still unstable at the end of the time period, he could have filed for an increase in 
his permanent partial disability to allow for any future loss of earnings under section 35-1-66. If 
he did not anticipate future disability, then he is no worse off than he would have been in a civil 
suit where he would have been required, but unable, to prove his future damages. 
In keeping with the holding and analysis of Avis, we hold that the time provisions found in 
sections 35-1-65 and -66 of the Workers' Compensation Act do not, on their face or as applied to 
Middlestadt, violate the open courts provision. 
CONCLUSION 
Middlestadt's claims for additional benefits were time-barred. We therefore affirm the 
Industrial Commission's dismissal of Middlestadt's claims. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
J u i i th V. . . . . / • •.. •:,. 
Gregory k * -me, JUOMC 
OPINION FOOTNOTES 
1 I he parties agree that Middlestadt's medical costs are covered by the original award. We therefore 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michie, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc 4 II Rights Reserved. 
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only address Middlestadt's claims for disability benefits arising from his inability to work following the 
operations. 
2 We noted our concerns about sua sponte actions by administrative tribunals in Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 847 P.2d 418, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24-25 (Utah App. 1993). In that 
case, we reversed a sua sponte ruling of the Tax Commission. The sua sponte action in Middlestadt's 
case, by comparison, was taken by an administrative law judge and was never challenged in subsequent 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission. We therefore do not reverse; nevertheless, we caution 
administrative tribunals generally about the pitfalls of sua sponte action. 
3 These sections have since been amended. A six-year limitation period is now found in section 
35-1-98 (Supp. 1992) 
4 Middlestadt asserts, in the alternative, that these sections violate the equal protection provision of 
the Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. I, § 24. Middlestadt does not, however, present us with any 
legal analysis to support the claim as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) (an 
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issue 
presented, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on"). "Absent a 
compelling reason why we should waive application of rule 24(a)(9), we do not address [appellant's] 
contention." First Security Bank of Utah v. Creech, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 60, 62 (Utah 1993). 
(c) 1992-1997 by Michic, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
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presents a jurisdictional question. See A.J. 
Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991); State v. Daven-
port, 30 Utah 2d 298, 517 P.2d 544, 545 n. 2 
(1973). We conclude the trial court proper-
ly denied defendant's motion as it was un-
timely. 
However, even if we were to reach the 
merits of defendant's motion to set aside 
his guilty plea, we would still affirm. We 
have already concluded that defendant's 
plea was entered in compliance with Rule 
11(5) and Gibbons and, thus, that defen-
dant's plea was voluntary. Therefore, de-
fendant's first ground for setting aside his 
plea is without merit. However, defendant 
also claims the trial court erred by not 
allowing defendant to withdraw his plea in 
view of new evidence favorable to defen-
dant. 
[7, 8] A trial court may abuse its discre-
tion by failing to set aside a guilty plea in 
light of new evidence.5 In the present 
case, during defendant's pro se argument 
to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant stat-
ed the basis for his motion was his and his 
neighbors' belief in his innocence. 
On appeal, defendant argues the testimo-
ny of his neighbors presents new, exculpa-
tory evidence. However, as the State 
notes, defendant fails to present affidavits 
from potential witnesses or even a plau-
sible version of the facts more favorable to 
him. Defendant's motion was supported 
only by defendant's statement that he was 
not guilty and his self-serving conjecture 
that others believed him innocent. These 
"new" facts are not sufficient to set aside 
his plea. 
GREENWOOD, J., concurs. 
BENCH, Presiding Judge (concurring 
specially): 
We hold in this case that the trial court 
lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant's 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In 
5. See, e.g., State v. Mildenhall, 747 P.2d 422, 424 
(Utah 1987) (trial court correctly denied defen-
dant's motion to withdraw guilty plea because 
of the "implausible timing and suspicious con-
tent" of new evidence favorable to defendant); 
State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 
view of that holding, it is unnecessary (and 
improper) to opine about the merits of de-
fendant's motion. 
Earl N. AVIS, Petitioner, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRI-
AL COMMISSION; and Salt Lake City 
Corporation, Respondents. 
No. 910574-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Aug. 31, 1992. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1992. 
Claimant appealed from order of the 
Industrial Commission dismissing claim for 
compensation on limitations grounds. The 
Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that 
statute of limitations did not violate equal 
protection or "open courts" constitutional 
provisions. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers* Compensation <3=>1939.1 
Deference is granted to Industrial 
Commission's application of law to particu-
lar facts only when there is grant of discre-
tion to agency concerning language in 
question, either expressly made in statute 
or implied from statutory language. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-99 (Repealed). 
2. Workers' Compensation e=>1090 
Because Industrial Commission is not 
court of general jurisdiction, it lacked au-
thority to address constitutionality of work-
1987) (trial court erred in denying defendant's 
motion to withdraw guilty plea because of "criti-
cal new evidence which cast doubt on defen-
dant's guilt," i.e., victim's admission that her 
testimony at preliminary hearing wrongly impli-
cated defendant). 
AVIS v. BOARD OF RE 
CUe a* 837 ?2d ! 
rs' compensation statute of limitations. 
f.A.1953, 35-1-99 (Repealed). 
3. Workers' Compensation «=»1269 
Statute providing that workers' com-
pensation claim was barred if not filed with 
Industrial Commission within three years 
from date of accident was "statute of limi-
tations/' rather than "statute of repose"; 
statute ran from date of injury, when cause 
of action accrued, and not from point in 
time unrelated to when cause of action 
arose. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-99 (Repealed). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4 Limitation of Actions <s=D4(2) 
State legislatures possess discretion to 
enact statutes of limitations, and these 
statutes are presumptively constitutional. 
5 Workers* Compensation <s=>39 
Statute providing that workers' com-
pensation claim was barred if not filed with 
Industrial Commission within three years 
from date of accident did not violate "open 
courts" provision of Utah Constitution as 
applied to claimant who knew of injury 
within limitations period. U.C.A.1953, 35-
1-99 (Repealed); Const. Art. 1, § 11. 
6. Constitutional Law <3=>245(4) 
Workers' Compensation G=39 
Workers' compensation statute of limi-
tations did not violate equal protection; re-
striction against claims for permanent par-
tial disability after statute of limitations 
had run did not discriminate unlawfully 
against those who had not been rated with-
in that time frame. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-99 
(Repealed); Const Art. 1, § 24. 
Brian D. Kelm (argued), Salt Lake City, 
for petitioner. 
Ray G. Montgomery, Asst. City Atty. 
^argued), Salt Lake City, for respondent 
' <'• Lake City Corp 
Before GREENWOOD, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
LEW OF INDUS. COM'N Utah 585 
(UtahApp. 1992) 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Petitioner, Earl N. Avis, appeals from an 
Industrial Commission (Commission) order 
dismissing his claim for compensation on 
the basis that it was filed after the applica-
ble three year statute of limitations had 
expired. We affirm the Commission's or-
der. 
BACKGROUND 
Because the Commission dismissed peti-
tioner's claim without a full hearing on the 
facts, "we presume, to the extent neces-
sary to resolve the issues on appeal, that 
the facts are as stated by petitioner." Ve-
larde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123, 
124 n. 2 (Utah App.1992). 
Petitioner was employed as a police offi-
cer for Salt Lake City (the City) when he 
was injured on the job, July 4, 1968. The 
left rear wheel of his three wheel motorcy-
cle hit a large chuck hole, jarring his back. 
Petitioner promptly reported the accident 
and was examined by a doctor whom the 
city designated. He was treated for recur-
ring back pain from 1968 to 1982. After 
consulting a different physician, petitioner 
underwent back surgery in February of 
1986. The City authorized payment for all 
medical expenses connected with the inju-
ry. In 1988, petitioner's treating physician 
rated him for permanent partial impair-
ment due to his back.1 
Petitioner filed a claim with the Commis-
sion on December 4, 1990, seeking a perma-
nent, partial disability award. The admin-
istrative law judge (AU) ruled that the 
statute of limitations in Utah Code Anno-
tated section 35-1-99 (1974) barred peti-
tioner's claim. Following a motion for re-
view, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's 
ruling. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES 
Petitioner argues on appeal that Utah 
Code Annotated section 35-1-99 (1974) vio-
lates the Utah Constitution's open courts 
1 In 1990, the City obtained a rating for petition- ability to pre-existing conditions and half to the 
er, attributing half the permanent partial dis- July 4, 1968 industrial injury. 
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provision and deprives him of equal protec-
tion as guaranteed in the Utah Constitu-
tion. Section 35-1-99 provides that "[i]f no 
claim for compensation is filed with the 
industrial commission within three years 
from the date of the accident . . . the right 
to compensation shall be wholly barred.,, 2 
[1,2] The Utah Administrative Proce-
dures Act allows this court to grant relief 
where the Commission "has erroneously 
interpreted or applied the law," Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989), or where 
"the statute or rule on which the agency 
action is based, is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. § 63-
46b-16(4Xa) (1989). "[W]to>n reviewing an 
application or interpretation of law we use 
a correction of error standard, giving no 
deference to the Commission's interpreta-
tion of the law." Anderson v. Public Ser-
vice Comm'n, 839 P.2d 822, 824 (Utah 
1992) (citing Savage Indus, v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 
1991)). Deference is granted to the Com-
mission's "application of the law to particu-
lar facts only when 'there is a grant of 
discretion to the agency concerning the lan-
guage in question, either expressly made in 
the statute or implied from the statutory 
language/ " Stokes v. Board of Review, 
832 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App.1992) (quoting 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of the 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 
589 (Utah 1991)); See also Anderson, 839 
P.2d at 824. Because the Commission is 
not a court of general jurisdiction, it lacked 
authority to address the constitutionality of 
the statute. See Velarde v. Board of Re-
view, 831 P.2d 123, 125 n. 5 (Utah App. 
1992). We therefore address the issue of 
the statute's facial validity for the first 
time on appeal as a question of law. Fur-
ther, there is no explicit statutory grant of 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-99 (1974) was amend-
ed in 1988 to extend the time for filing a claim 
to six years. The statute was amended again in 
1990 and recodified in section 35-1-98(2) 
(1991). This particular provision was left essen-
tially the same and now reads in pertinent part: 
A claim for compensation for temporary 
total disability benefits, temporary partial dis-
ability benefits, permanent partial disability 
discretion to the Commission to apply the 
statute to the facts, and counsel have not 
identified any implicit grant of discretion. 
We therefore address the application of the 
statute in this case using a correction of 
error standard of review. Id. 
Open Courts Provision 
Petitioner urges this court to construe 
the statute of limitations in Utah Code An-
notated section 35-1-99 (1974) under the 
due process analysis provided in Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 672 
(Utah 1985), and a subsequent line of cases 
in which statutes of repose were held to 
violate the open courts provision of the 
Utah Constitution. In Berry and subse-
quent cases, "Utah courts have interpreted 
the open courts provision of the Utah Con-
stitution to proscribe statutes of repose 
unless the statutes have certain redeeming 
characteristics." Velarde v. Board of Re-
view, 831 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah App.1992). 
Utah's open courts provision guarantees a 
person access to the courts "for an injury 
done to him in his person, property or 
reputation." Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. A 
statute of repose satisfies the open courts 
provision if it "provides an injured person 
an effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy 'by due course of law1 for vindica-
tion of his constitutional interest" Berry, 
717 P.2d at 680 (quoting Utah Const. Art. I, 
§ 11). "[I]f there is no substitute or alter-
native remedy provided, abrogation of the 
remedy . . . may be justified only if there is 
a clear social or economic evil to be elimi-
nated...." Id. 
Petitioner claims his case is analogous to 
Wrolstad v. Industrial Comm'n, 786 P.2d 
243 (Utah App.1990), in which this court 
benefits, or permanent total disability benefits 
is wholly barred, unless an application for 
hearing is filed with the commission within 
six years after the date of the accident. 
Petitioner requests that the current six-year 
limitations period also be declared unconstitu-
tional. However, our ruling on the earlier stat-
ute's constitutionality renders this point moot. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ANALYSIS 
AVIS v. BOARD OF REVIEW OF INDUS. 
Cite M 837 PJtd 5*4 (UtahApp, 1992) 
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held that a statute of repose in the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Act violat-
ed the open courts provision. In Wrolstad 
this court determined that a statute which 
operated to preclude a worker from filing 
an occupational disease claim before the 
worker was aware of the disease because 
of an absence of symptoms for many years, 
and which failed to provide an alternative 
for compensation, violated the open courts 
provision. Petitioner in the present case 
argues that receiving a permanent, partial 
disability rating twenty years after a job 
related injury is equivalent to a worker 
being exposed to asbestos, and then having 
a diagnosis of asbestosis occur many years 
later. Petitioner contends that, just as the 
worker exposed to asbestos cannot file an 
occupational disease claim for a disease of 
which he is unaware, he could not have 
filed his claim for disability benefits until 
he received a disability rating. Additional-
ly, petitioner argues that there is no rea-
sonable alternative remedy available to him 
under the workers' compensation statute 
because a claim for benefits from the City 
is his exclusive remedy. 
Every case petitioner cites in support of 
his open courts argument addresses stat-
utes of repose. He has cited no cases in 
which a statute of limitations was held to 
violate the open courts provision. He ar-
gues, however, that there is no meaningful 
difference between statutes of repose and 
statutes of limitation and that we therefore 
should apply Berry and its progeny to sec-
tion 35-1-99. We do not agree that the 
two types of statutes are essentially identi-
cal. 
[3] "A statute of repose . . . prevents 
suit a statutorily specified number of years 
after a particular event occurs, without re-
gard to when the cause of action accrues." 
Velarde, 831 P.2d at 125 (citation omitted). 
"A statute of limitations precludes suit a 
statutorily specified number of years after 
a cause of action accrues." Id. "[S]tat-
utes of limitations 'are designed to promote 
justice by preventing surprises through the 
revival of claims that have been allowed to 
slumber until evidence has been lost, mem-
ories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared.' " Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 
84, 86 (Utah 1981) (quoting Order of R.R. 
Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 
U.S. 342, 348-49, 64 S.Ct 582, 586, 88 L.Ed. 
788 (1944)). Section 35-1-99 is a statute of 
limitations because it runs from the date of 
injury, when the cause of action accrues, 
not from a point in time unrelated to when 
the cause of action arose. As a result, the 
Berry line of cases is not directly applica-
ble, but we consider their general constitu-
tional analysis under the open courts provi-
sion. We also examine cases involving 
statutes of limitations. 
[4] State legislatures possess the dis-
cretion to enact statutes of limitations, and 
these statutes are presumptively constitu-
tional. See McHenry v. Utah Valley 
Hosp., 724 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D.Utah 1989). 
"[A] statute of limitations is constitutional-
ly sound if it should allow a reasonable, not 
unlimited, time in which to bring suit" Id. 
" '[W]hat shall be considered a reasonable 
time must be settled by the judgment of 
the legislature, and the courts will not in-
quire into the wisdom of establishing the 
period of legal bar, unless the time allowed 
is manifestly so insufficient that the stat-
ute becomes a denial of justice/" Id. 
(quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 
63, 22 S.Ct 573, 575, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902)). 
Courts have recognized exceptions to allevi-
ate the harsh effects of statutes of limita-
tions, but the exceptions involve cases 
where "plaintiff[s] had no way of knowing 
the injury had occurred until after the stat-
ute had run and therefore no way of affix-
ing or exploring potential liability within 
the statutory period." McHenry, 724 
F.Supp. at 839. 
In the context of civil tort claims, "[a] 
cause of action for personal injury general-
ly accrues when the accident occurs." 
Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196, 
1199 (Utah 1987) (Howe, J., concurring); 
see also, Gardner v. Industrial Comm'n, 
517 P.2d 1329, 1330 (Utah 1973) (applicant 
did not file compensation claim within ei-
ther three years from date of accident or 
date of last compensation, therefore claim 
was wholly barred under section 35-1-99). 
Additionally, "mere ignorance of the exis-
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tence of a cause of action does not prevent 
the running of the statute of limitations." 
Myers, 635 P.2d at 86. 
[5] Petitioner knew of his injury on 
July 4, 1968. He received medical treat-
ment for his injury and was aware of recur-
ring back pain over a period of several 
years. Therefore, even though petitioner 
did not seek a disability rating or file a 
compensation claim until twenty-two years 
after his accident, he knew of the injury 
and could have filed for compensation with-
in the statutory period. Petitioner seeks a 
rule which would postpone running of the 
statute until he "discovered" the full ex-
tent of his injury. The workers' compensa-
tion statute, however, does not require sta-
bilization before filing for benefits. Peti-
tioner's argument that he had no alterna-
tive remedy because the Workers' Compen-
sation Act is his exclusive remedy, also 
fails because under either the Act or a civil 
tort action, he would be subject to a statute 
of limitations. His alternative remedy was 
to timely file. 
We conclude that the statute of limita-
tions found in Utah Code Annotated section 
35-1*99 does not, on its face, manifest a 
denial of justice that would require us to 
overcome the statute's presumption of con-
stitutionality. It provides a reasonable 
time to file a claim, dating from the date of 
injury. See McHenry, 724 F.Supp. at 837 
(upholding the constitutionality of Utah's 
four-year statute of limitations for civil ac-
tions). We further conclude that the stat-
ute as applied to petitioner does not violate 
the open courts provision of the Utah Con-
stitution because he knew of his injury 
within the limitations period. 
Equal Protection 
[6] Petitioner also asks this court to 
invalidate section 35-1-99 on equal protec-
tion grounds. He argues that restricting 
injured workers from bringing claims for 
permanent, partial disability after the stat-
ute of limitations has run, unlawfully dis-
criminates against those who have not been 
rated within that time frame. This argu-
ment is not persuasive. 
The equal protection provision of article 
I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution 
states: "All laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." The supreme 
court's most recent formulation of the 
equal protection test is as follows: " '[The] 
test to be applied under article I, section 24 
is whether the classification of those sub-
ject to the legislation is a reasonable one 
and bears a reasonable relationship to an 
achievement of the legitimate legislative 
purpose.'" Condemarin v. University 
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356 (Utah 1989) (quot-
ing Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 
1988)). 
The statute of limitations in section 35-
1-99 classifies injured workers in a reason-
able manner in that all injured workers are 
subject to the same limitations period with-
in which to file a claim for compensation. 
An injured worker's disability rating is a 
component that is separate and distinct 
from the actual compensation claim, and 
the worker's responsibility is to timely file 
within the statutory period with or without 
a disability rating in hand. We also con-
clude that limiting the compensation claim 
period for workers bears a reasonable rela-
tionship to the achievement of a legitimate 
legislative purpose. Limiting compensa-
tion claims to a three-year period from the 
date of the accident protects employers and 
the State of Utah Second Injury Fund from 
having to defend stale claims—a legitimate 
legislative purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the statute of limita-
tions in Utah Code Annotated section 35-1-
99 (1974) does not violate the open courts 
provision of the Utah Constitution, and ad-
ditionally conclude that there is no equal 
protection violation inherent in its applica-
tion. The Industrial Commission's ruling is 
affirmed. 
RUSSON and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
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APPENDIX 18 WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT, 
A CAREFUL BALANCING OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
WORKERS7 COMPENSATION ACT 
A CAREFUL BALANCING OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS-
Employer 
Exclusive remedy 
§35-1-60 U.C.A. 
Action can only be 
brought in administrative 
proceedings. 
Speedy resolution. 
No lengthy jury trial 
with its uncertainties. 
Less costly. 
Limited, predictable 
fixed damages. 
a. No pain and 
suffering damages. 
b. No projected future 
special damages. 
Damages decided and 
paid as they accrue. 
Broad based risk 
spreading on industry 
through mandatory 
insurance or qualifying 
through bonding with 
Industrial Commission to 
be a self-insured 
employer. 
Right to be reimbursed 
from third party 
recoveries §35-1-62 . 
a. Is "trustee" of the 
cause of action for 
injured worker or 
dependant heirs in 
death case. 
All employers treated 
alike. 
Injured Worker and/or 
Dependant Heirs 
1. A sure, predictable, 
though limited remedy --
because of mandatory 
insurance coverage. 
2. No fault system --no 
reduction or elimination 
of benefits by comparable 
fault. 
3. Comparatively speedy and 
inexpensive 
administrative process. 
4. Preservation of right to 
pursue third parties for 
full damages -- §35-1-62, 
U.C.A. 
5. Employer and employee on 
same side in third party 
cases. 
6. All employees treated 
alike. 
7. Continuing jurisdiction 
of the Industrial 
Commission to modify 
awards based on changes 
in injured employee's 
condition. §35-1-78 
U.C.A. 
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